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Abstract: 
 
 This paper will address the illegality of Morocco’s nationalist annexation of Western 
Sahara and how the United States plays the accommodating role through the selling of arms, 
economic aid, and diplomatic support. Considered as Africa’s last colony, the Saharawi people 
have not experienced the basic human right to self-determination and the right for independence. 
These rights are continued to be withheld for the sake of Moroccan nationalism and their 
“rightful and ethnic” claims to the territory, disregarding the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ)’s advisory opinion ruling in favor of Saharawi self-determination. It explores the 
chronology of the Saharawi population from the migration of the Sanhanja Berbers prior to 
Spanish colonization up to the initiation of Morocco’s autonomy plan in the occupied territory. 
Although this paper briefly examines the background to the conflict, the significance of the 
conflict is illustrated through a framework of international law and human rights by examining 
the ICJ’s advisory opinion, the Moroccan invasion and military occupancy, and the torture of 
Saharawis by Moroccan forces. Examining the occupation in an international law and human 
rights framework thus poses an important question: How does the United States, a close ally to 
the Moroccan Kingdom, support the illegal occupation? This will examine the United States’ 
“neutrality” by exploring the US’ involvement in the Madrid Accords up to the current Obama 
administration’s support for autonomy in the occupied territory. Finally, by examining the 
operation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and how gender equality is a tool 
to fight colonialism, the United States’ support to the Kingdom will be questioned. The goal of 
this paper is to challenge US foreign policy, which ignores the violation of human rights and 
international law committed by Morocco in occupied Western Sahara, and the US’ narrowly 
defined national interests in the region. 
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Introduction 
 Saharawi people are descendants from a mixture of Berbers, Africans, and Arabs. The 
Nomadic Sanhaja Berber tribe migrated and settled in the region coming from the Maghreb 
region (Morocco and Mauritania specifically), regulating the region’s trade routes in the 
beginning of the eighth century.1 In the 13th century, the Yemini Nomadic tribe known as Beni 
Hassan attempted to migrate into the Maghreb region.2 The Beni Hassan tribe intermixed with 
the Sanhaja Berbers, the original inhabitants in Western Sahara. The Sanhaja Berbers eventually 
accepted and adapted to the Arab culture after numerous clashes between each other.3 To this 
day, Saharawi people speak Hassaniya Arabic, the original language derived from the Beni 
Hassan tribe. 
 From 1884-1975, the Spanish empire colonized the region of Western Sahara. During 
their rule, the Spanish empire utilized Saharawi populations and women for their resources, 
which was rich in phosphates.4 It was during this colonial period when the Spanish created the 
term “Saharawi” to the natural inhabitants, which prior to colonization did not exist. Although 
the term Saharawi was established through colonialism, this led to the identity of nationalist 
Spanish Saharans who eventually fought against colonialist persecution. It was during the 1957-
58 uprising between Spanish Saharans and French and Spanish military that led to the beginning 
of pro-independence seeking in Western Sahara. Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, recognized as 
the first activists to promote independence, organized the Liberation Movement of the Saqiyah al 
Hamra and Wadi al-Dhahab. This organization “called for the dissolution of traditional social 
                                                          
1
 Ira M. Lapidus. A History Of Islamic Societies. 2nd Edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002): 302 
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 Rachel Warner. “Arab Invasions.” A Country Study: Mauritania. Library Of Congress. Last updated July 27, 2010. 
4
 Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution. (NY: Syracuse University 
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strucures as a step toward building national consciousness.”5 Bassiri, who attended primary and 
secondary school in Morocco and the eventually studying journalism in Cairo and Damascus, 
gained its strength from the veterans of the 1957-58 uprising. Bassiri publicly announced the 
movement’s objectives in 1970, leading the colonized nation toward a nationalist identity of 
Saharawi. 
 It was not until El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, born into a nomadic family seeking refuge in 
Southern Morocco, established the core movement that represents independence and the 
Saharawi population. In 1971, El-Ouali, who was heavily influenced by the writings of Franz 
Fanon, found the Front for the Liberation of Saguia-El Hamra and Rio De Orro (POLISARIO 
Front), a guerilla movement seeking independence and representing the nationalist Saharawi 
symbol.6 The POLISARIO fended off Spanish colonizers throughout the region. Eventually, the 
Spanish empire began to weaken, but UN Resolution 2983 in 1972 reassured “the inalienable 
right of the people of the Sahara to self-determination and independence,”7 thus beginning the 
decolonization period. 
 Even prior to Spanish decolonization, there had been claims by both Morocco and 
Mauritania stating legal ties to the territory. The dispute continued when Morocco brought the 
case to the International Court of Justice requesting an advisory opinion between the two 
nations’ ties to the region. The following two questions were considered as the forefront of the 
case: 1) Was Western Sahara (Rio De Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by 
Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? If the answer to the first question was in the 
negative, then 2) What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco 
and the Mauritania Entity? According to the court’s decision, it ruled that during Spanish 
                                                          
5
 Ibid: 103 
6
 Ibid, p. 104 
7
 Resolution 2983, General Assembly Meeting, December 14, 1972 
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colonization, Western Sahara was not a territory that belonged to no one. The court also ruled in 
favor of both Mauritania and Morocco having legal ties to the region. Most importantly, the 
court decided that neither nation has territorial ties allowing sovereignty in the region: 
 In short, the decolonization process to be accelerated which is envisaged by the 
 General Assembly in this provision is one which will respect the right of the 
 population of Western Sahara to determine their future political status by their 
 own freely expressed will. This right is not affected by the present request for an 
 advisory opinion...The right of that population to self-determination constitutes 
 therefore a basic assumption of the questions put to the court.8 
 
 The ruling of the court showed no effect of relinquishment from the Moroccan 
government. Just before the ruling took place, King Hassan II ordered a preparation of invasion 
with tanks and artillery stationed near the border of Western Sahara.9 Once the highly anticipated 
court’s ruling of the region did not approve of either nation, King Hassan II publicly called for a 
national migration and movement into Western Sahara. He proclaimed the region for Moroccans, 
requiring citizens to hold the Holy Qu’uran and the Moroccan flag while marching into the 
region. The march consisted of 350,000 Moroccan citizens which “reclaimed” the right of the 
territory, popularly known as “The Green March.”10 
 Prior to the intervention, the Polisario Front was created in 1973.11 The movement’s 
objective (eventually supported by Algeria in 1975) is to promote Saharawi self-determination 
and declare the state of Western Sahara as their own.12 Within two years of its establishment as a 
national liberation movement by fighting off Spanish colonizers, Morocco’s occupation of 
Western Sahara began on October 31.13 Thus, the guerilla movement shifted its target from 
                                                          
8
 “Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion.” ICJ Reports. 1975: 36 
9
 Zunes and Mundy. Western Sahara: 5 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid: 3 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid: 6 
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Spanish to Moroccan colonizers, erupting in a full-fledged war between the Moroccan army and 
the Polisario guerilla movement.  
 As Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco was slowly declining in health, Prince Juan 
Carlos became acting head of state on October 30, 1975. Spain began to reexamine the Spanish-
American treaty allowing for the presence of US bases in return for economic and military aid 
into Spain.14 Soon after, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s CIA confidant continued to 
make trips between Rabat and Madrid. After the Green March was held, Carlos flew to El-
Aioun, the Western Saharan capital, to assure Spanish support for Saharawi self-determination. 
As a result of strenuous pressure from the United States, Spain agreed to sign on to what became 
known as the Madrid Accords on November 14, 1975, transitioning its administrative power to 
Morocco and Mauritania. I will discuss the United States’ involvement during this process in 
greater detail later. 
 The Moroccan conquest led to thousands of refugees fleeing to neighboring Algeria in 
the Tindouf region. Camps were established with the help from the Algerian government and the 
international community.  On February 17, 1976, the Polisario declared the establishment of the 
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as the legitimate state representing the Saharawi 
person, which has since been recognized by approximately 80 states. 
 Despite initial nationalist euphoria from the conquest, the unexpectedly strong resistance 
resulted in high casualties and economic hardship which threatened the survival of the Moroccan 
regime. Having survived two coup attempts prior to the Western Saharan war, King Hassan was 
faced with declining popular support and rumored coup plots.  
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 By the end of 1977, the costs of war exceeded $2 billion a year, increasing a larger deficit 
that later led to war taxes.15 Moroccan forces were beginning to resent the war effort, resulting to 
further violence, desertions, and mutinies. According to Leo Kamil, “the Moroccan adventure in 
Western Sahara was seen as Morocco’s Vietnam.”16 King Hassan’s recognition of soldiers’ 
negative disposition on the warfront, the Kingdom doubled soldier’s pay and new remunerations 
to boost morale of troops and their families, paid entirely by Saudi Arabia.17 
 Despite widespread international condemnation, including two UN Security Council 
resolutions calling on Morocco to respect Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, the 
United States and France continued to provide military assistance. This did not help Morocco’s 
economic situation, however, as an increasingly large share of the national budget was devoted 
to military spending. The severe budget crisis in Morocco’s war on Western Sahara came during 
the construction of the first berm, or wall, in 1980. The wall stretches 600 miles and is heavily 
guarded with barbed wire and “millions of mines”18 funded by French and American 
governments.19 This transition from an offensive to a defensive strategy illustrated the 
diminishing ability of Moroccan forces to defeat the Polisario. 
 Morocco’s failure to engage in serious talks led the Organization of African Unity to 
recognize the SADR as a full member state, resulting in Morocco’s withdrawal from the 
organization. However, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar helped lead talks resulting in a 
ceasefire agreement on August 30, 1988, based on the framework given by the OAU.20 This led 
to UN Security Council Resolution 621, requesting: 
                                                          
15
 Ibid: 16 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid 
18
 UN Referendum for Western Sahara: 9 Years and Counting, Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 
 September 13, 2000 
19
 Kamil, Fueling the Fire: 70 
20
 UN Referendum for Western Sahara 
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 The Secretary-General to transmit to it as soon as possible a report on the holding 
 of a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and on 
 ways and means to ensure the organization and supervision of such a referendum 
 by the United nations in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity.21 
 
The methodology which Cuellar aimed for was accepted with UNSC Resolution 658, which: 
 Welcomes the intention of the Security-General to dispatch, in the immediate 
 future, a technical mission to the territory and to neighboring countries, in 
 particular to refine the administrative aspects of the outlined plan and to obtain 
 the necessary information for the preparation of a further report to the Council.22 
 
 This request for a technical mission led to the creation of the United Nations Mission for 
the Referendum of Western Sahara (MINURSO). The goal of this mission was to mandate the 
voting registration and the referendum for independence under the SADR or an integration of 
Morocco. During this 11 year process, multiple complications occurred. Although both parties 
agreed that ethnic Saharawis native to Western Sahara should be allowed to vote, it did not come 
to a conclusion on how this relation would be measured. For instance, Polisario called for the 
1974 consensus of Saharawis, which would have amounted to 74,000 Saharawis. However, 
“Morocco planned to present more than double that number in the vote.”23 This presented 
evidence of Moroccan integration into Western Sahara by “moving large numbers of its citizens 
into Western Sahara.”24 This forced MINURSO to consider tens of thousands of voter 
registration, eventually leading toward a breakdown in 1996.25 
 By September 2000 and nearly $440 million later, “MINURSO unfortunately [was] far 
from its goal.”26 After the failed voter registration attempt from MINURSO, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan assigned former Secretary of State James Baker as a personal envoy to 
establish a new referendum that both parties can agree to. Baker began by finally bringing the 
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 Resolution 621, United Nations Security Council, September 20, 1988 
22
 Resolution 658, United Nations Security Council, June 27, 1990 
23
 Zunes and Mundy. Western Sahara: xxx 
24
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26
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two parties together in London. Baker’s first peace proposal was to establish an autonomy plan 
for five years, then a vote which “did not explicitly offer independence.”27 As Morocco accepted 
the peace plan, Polisario, backed by Algeria, withheld its agreements. This led to Baker’s second 
proposal, similar to the former, but offering the vote for integration, independence, or continued 
autonomy. Although Polisario was reluctant, given Morocco’s refusal to follow through with 
1991 referendum, Algeria compelled Polisario to accept the plan. Morocco, obviously refusing 
the idea of an independent Western Sahara, stalled the peace plan for support from the Security 
Council to prevent the plan being implemented. Lack of support from both the United States and 
France led to Baker’s resignation post in 2004. 
 As the referendum process stagnated, Morocco issued its own “autonomy plan” that 
allowed a Saharawi government in Laayoune, but prohibited the ability for Saharawis to choose 
the option of independence. Obviously refused by Saharawi nationalists, widespread of political 
uprisings and nonviolent protests occurred throughout the latter decade of the 2000s. During 
these protests, numerous acts of torture, sexual humiliation, disappearances, and murder 
increased among the Saharawis. As for the little attention given from the Obama administration, 
their calls for human rights monitoring in the area are still refused by the Moroccan government. 
What was originally based on the threat of an authoritarian’s sovereignty and strength has turned 
into a reliance on natural resources and abuse of power. 
 Today, Morocco has occupied approximately 80-85 percent of Western Sahara. The 
military invasion resulted in a large number of Saharawi refugees fleeing into neighboring 
Algeria, setting up refugee camps in the Tindouf region. Saharawis who remained in Western 
Sahara or live in southern Morocco are continuously subjected to various human rights abuses 
such as torture, false imprisonment, sexual humiliation toward Saharawi women, and 
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 Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara: xxxi 
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disappearances. After 36 years, Saharawis continue their struggle for self-determination and 
independence while the major powers in the international community continue to neglect 
addressing Moroccan occupation. In this thesis, I inspect how Morocco has been able to get 
away with conducting a militaristic occupation in Western Sahara which is a clear violation of 
international law. 
 While Morocco continues to use these methods into Western Sahara, the United States 
lacks using efficient methods in establishing a peaceful settlement plan between Morocco and 
Western Sahara. The United States considers Morocco as one of its closest allies in the Arab 
world. Considering Morocco was the first country to recognize the United States as a sovereign 
nation, the political ties between both countries remains firm. Morocco has allowed multiple air 
landings during World War II, playing a strategic role during the war. Morocco continues to 
promote Western ideologies toward African and Arab countries, such as Morocco’s support for 
the Camp David Accords as well as sending troops to Zaire at the United States’ request. 
Morocco has been a key player in promoting American interests throughout the Middle East and 
Africa and still maintains their passion in doing so. 
 Therefore, I pose the following questions for further research: How does Morocco violate 
international and humanitarian law for the sake of nationalist expansion? How does the United 
States, a state that publicly announces its neutrality to the conflict, support Morocco’s nationalist 
expansion into Western Sahara? How does the expansion into Western Sahara impact Saharawi’s 
way to life? In this paper, I argue that the United States plays an aiding and abetting role in 
Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara while neglecting the principles of human rights and 
international law, of which are practiced within the SADR. What I hope to find in this research 
9 
 
 
 
are reasons why the United States has continued to support militaristic occupation as well as a 
clear understanding of Moroccan nationalist occupation in Western Sahara. 
 
Methodology 
 Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara can be analyzed through different strategies. 
There are many historical events to record as well as studies to be conducted. However, there are 
many obstacles that may alter the study. Furthermore, some obstacles may include a high amount 
of risk that is both threatening to the study, but more importantly to someone’s life, including 
myself who identifies as a Moroccan-American. 
 The methodology I plan to use for this study is solely based on secondary research. I 
begin by examining the literature focusing on the topics of the nation and the state, power, and 
colonialism. This will provide a literature framework that correlates to Morocco’s colonization 
of Western Sahara, countless human rights abuses in the region committed by Moroccan forces 
and the United States’ continued support to the Kingdom. 
 Second, I examine the actions committed by Morocco and how the nationalist expansion 
violates humanitarian and international law. I layout the ICJ’s advisory opinion in 1975, the 
construction of the wall during the 1980s, countless resolutions that have been neglected by the 
Kingdom in regards to the region, and the daily occurrence of torture by Moroccan forces. 
 Third, I explore the United States’ historical ties with Morocco. I will examine the role 
the United States has played from the start of the conflict up to the present Obama 
administration. Then, I will explore Saharawi identity within the SADR and Polisario, explaining 
in detail why the United States should hold a more neutral position considering SADR’s and 
Polisario’s initiatives. This specific look at Saharawi identity will be examined by how Saharawi 
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women play an important role in the occupation, giving a closer look at Saharawi identity 
altogether. Finally, I will attempt to examine the perception Moroccans have on Western Saharan 
occupation, determining their “support.” 
 
Human Rights and International Law 
 This research will examine Morocco’s countless violations of human rights and 
international law. I begin by illustrating how the Green March is in violation of Article 2 of the 
UN Charter as well as numerous testimonies from Saharawi activists and citizens who have been 
tortured and harassed. 
 I will explore this perspective by examining the authors mentioned above as well as those 
in the book Multilateralism and International Law with Western Sahara as a Case Study, edited 
by Neville Botha, Michele Olivier, and Delarey Van Tonder. These arguments illustrate the 
violations of international law committed by the Moroccan government. Furthermore, I will 
examine testimonies given to Human Rights Watch as well as Hayat Erguibi’s video testimony 
that went viral in 2010. 
 These testimonies will illustrate countless violations of conventions and charters to which 
the Kingdom of Morocco is a party, such as the International Convention of Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
and most importantly the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 
 
The United States 
 For this research, I am examining the United States and the role they have played in this 
conflict. It is understandable that the study must also consider other key actors—France, Algeria, 
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Spain, and the OAU—and their factors will be definitely included. However, the study is mostly 
focusing on how the United States itself has played an extremely important role and how the 
United States can still find a solution toward self-determination without returning to violence. I 
will examine how the United States has stood behind Morocco’s annexation quest through their 
long diplomatic history of US sovereign recognition, US military aid, and continued IMF debt 
forgiveness. 
 I will base off of Leo Kamil’s book Fueling The Fire: US Policy and the Western Sahara 
Conflict in regards to the United States’ role starting in 1975. Kamil examines the United States’ 
role in the conflict and how their support to Morocco influenced Morocco’s annexation of 
Western Sahara. I will also use examples from Zunes and Mundy, Zoubir, and testimonies given 
by former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Allen Keiswetter. 
 
Saharawi Nationalism 
 It is important to recognize how the identity of Saharawi became observed. This gives 
context to why Saharawis are fighting for self-determination against two forms of colonization. 
This then leads to examining the first wave of colonization from the Spanish during the late 
1800s. It will illustrate the beginning struggles for self-determination and independence among 
Saharawi people. Then, I will examine the decolonization period of the Spanish and the 
transitioning period toward Moroccan annexation. 
 These two characteristics built the Saharawi nationalist identity that is seen today. I 
specifically look at this nationalist identity in a feminist lens as it is a high contributing factor to 
both Western Saharan nationalism and Moroccan differentiation. Various authors, including 
12 
 
 
 
Anna Lippert and Joanna Allen, have conducted extensive research on Saharawi women in the 
camps. 
 
Why Solely Secondary Research? 
 Many may question the reasoning behind solely conducting secondary on a topic that 
would need more visual understanding. Considering this is an important conflict, as it is 
considered the last colony of Africa, there are two significant reasons why I have decided to not 
conduct open interviews. 
 First, there are serious risks to certain lives, including my own. Upon entering the 
occupied territory as an American would draw speculation to the Moroccan government. I would 
have to take risks going into the territory and withhold my purpose of staying in Western Sahara. 
Once advancing, it is highly likely for officers to follow me in plain clothes, especially if they 
see me conducting interviews publicly about self-determination and independence in Western 
Sahara. Considering my given Moroccan name, the outcome of questioning the kingdom will be 
seen as a threat to the nation and could prevent me from conducting further research. 
 Second, the subject on Western Sahara is considered a taboo in proper Morocco. The 
risks for endangering my life and many others are incredibly high. Furthermore, the Istiqlal 
mentality among the population is instilled in the population. Gaining an honest answer about 
Morocco’s occupation in Western Sahara (if the hypothetical interviewee has truly opposing 
views about occupation) would be strenuous and difficult to obtain. Thus, secondary research on 
the topic by previous researchers and authors will suffice. 
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Literature Review 
 The conflict in Western Sahara can be elaborated through different theoretical 
perspectives. Although awareness among the general public is low, there are still significant 
amounts of literature based on this topic and others similar to it. 
 I elaborate on the theme of power when discussing the conflict between Morocco and 
Western Sahara. Power is a concept that has been defined, measured, and examined through 
many different perspectives. It is examined through the behavior of those in power and how it is 
used. It can be measured through the means of the amount of resources a state gains or through 
their ability of manipulation. 
 Historically, power has evolved into different meanings and characteristics. First, I 
examine the functions and qualifications of the state. This will give the example of justifying the 
means of violence as a way to gain power within a given territory. It will also distinguish the 
definitions of both the state and the nation which brings a discussion on the nationalist discourse 
in Morocco.  
 Second, I will begin to examine the early stages of power theory by elaborating on Karl 
Marx’s critique of capitalism. This critique sets the stage for critical thought and examines how 
power is obtained. Then, I elaborate on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, which is the most 
relevant piece to this study and connect it with Marx’s ideology. I then elaborate on how 
Gramsci’s theory started the ideology of neorealism and the balance of power. Then, I examine 
the social understandings of how violence is used by the state. Finally, and most importantly, I 
examine the definition and tools of colonialism, showing that the ability for a state to colonize 
another cannot exist without the possession of the colonizing state’s power. 
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The State 
 In order to fully comprehend the meaning of the state—differentiating from the nation—
on must examine the process behind the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This significant piece of 
legislation designated that this peace shall establish sovereignty in given territories in which 
“each party shall endeavor to procure the benefit, honor, and advantage of the other.”28 This 
piece of legislation allows the establishment of an institution, in which no entity will have greater 
sovereignty over it.  
 Yet, a more concrete definition of the state is explained through international law. The 
qualifications for a “legitimized” state can derive from the Montevideo Conventions of 1933. 
These qualifications are stated in Article 1, which list that a state must consist of “a permanent 
population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.”29 Yet, Article 3 states that “the political existence of the state is independent of 
recognition by the other states.”30 This suggests that states are only recognized if others wish to 
recognize them as such. 
 Nevertheless, the characteristics of the state mentioned above do not consider 
subjectivity. It only establishes the objectivities of the state, which are thus used as the norm to 
recognize the sovereignty of other states. It does not address how a state is able to control its 
citizens. Therefore, within this context, it is important to recognize the state defined by Max 
Weber. Weber defines the state not by its objectivity, but by the ability of how the state manages 
its citizens: 
 Every state is founded on force…A state is a human community that successfully 
 claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
                                                          
28
 Article I. The Treaty of Westphalia. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp 
29
 Article 1. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State, 1933. http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-
 convention-rights-duties-states/p15897 
30
 Article 3. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State, 1933. 
 http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897 
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 territory…Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is 
 ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state 
 permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence.31 
 
 Weber defines the state in this context as the ability to control violence within its given 
territory. Through this definition, we are able to illustrate how power is gained. The ability to use 
these characteristics can give other “states” the ability to obtain domination of others. Therefore, 
Weber’s definition of the state leads to the modern description of power, which has different 
interpretations and has developed into different meanings. 
 However, Weber’s definition of the state is simply evolved from Niccolo Machiavelli’s 
most well-known work The Prince. Machiavelli, who wrote that “all states and dominions which 
hold or have held sway over mankind are either republics or monarchies,” proclaimed that “new 
states are either previously accustomed to the rule of another prince, or else have been free states 
which are annexed either by force of arms of the prince or of others.”32 He reminds us that the 
newly recognized state is not necessarily new: 
 Men change masters willingly, hoping to better themselves, making them take 
 arms against their rulers. You find your enemies in all those you have injured by 
 occupying the dominion, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who 
 have helped you obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfill their 
 expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being under an 
 obligation to them. For which reason, however strong your armies may be, you 
 will always need the favor of the inhabitants to take possession of a province.33 
 
 Machiavelli’s portrayal of the state can be used to explain Morocco’s ambition to annex 
Western Sahara. Considering the state was under scrutiny, Morocco’s ambition to annex Western 
Sahara derived from Hassan II’s predecessor, Mohammed V, whose objective was to extend 
Moroccan sovereignty into neighboring, already recognized sovereignties. Furthermore, Weber’s 
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monopolization of violence relates to the construction of the walls during the Western Sahara 
War. Morocco began constructing a series of walls, or berms, that started separating Moroccan 
controlled territories from unclaimed territory during the 1980s. There are six separate berms that 
have expanded into Western Sahara, leaving only a quarter of land that is unoccupied. These 
berms are heavily guarded with manpower, barbed wire, and landmines. Within their controlled 
territory, Morocco has continuously attempted to mandate the violence when conflict erupts 
between Saharawi and Moroccan forces. 
 
The Nation 
 Hugh Seton-Watson writes that there is no “scientific definition” of the nation, yet it 
exists and has existed throughout history.34 This is to suggest that the concept of nationalism is 
only able to exist through the commonality of people. The nation is neither an entity nor a figure, 
but a common ideology shared by multiple people. Ernest Gellner builds on this idea by stating 
that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where 
they do not exist.”35 Gellner suggests that nationalism is not built in from the establishment of 
the state, but is imagined through populations sharing similar cultural interests. 
 Benedict Anderson builds on the idea that the nation is not established through the 
functions of the state. Rather than having to build a nation through the state—an entity which is 
constructed to help monopolize or control its inhabitants—the nation is instead 
 An imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and 
 sovereign…members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
 fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
 the image of their communion36 
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Anderson is building on the fact that nationalism is not a constructed entity, but a shared 
imagined community with particular characteristics defining them. Tom Nairin states a similar 
definition on nationalism by stating that it is the “pathology of modern developmental history, as 
inescapable as ‘neurosis.’”37 Nairin, however, suggests that nationalism is an inevitable trait for 
people to develop. 
 Andersen’s definition of nationalism can be associated with the idea of “Greater 
Morocco.” This idea expresses the importance of expanding its nationalist sovereignty to other 
neighboring sovereign nations, which is believed to return these areas to Moroccan sovereignty. 
This imagined community of Morocco spread out through most of West Africa is an ideology 
shared by a large majority of the Moroccan community. It is Anderson’s idea of nationalism 
which leads to the nationalist discourse in Morocco. 
 
Istiqlal and the Nationalist Discourse 
 Anderson’s interpretation of nationalism correlates to the idea of Moroccan nationalism, 
but the nationalist discourse of this idea constructed to defeat French colonialism. Prior to 
independence in 1956, Moroccan nationalism amounted to very little. Nationalists handed out 
pamphlets to claim independence in Morocco, but French officers considered these acts as a 
great “doctoral thesis” considering the minimal support nationalists were gaining.38 It was not 
until 1940 during World War II after France was invaded by Germany that Moroccans began to 
perceive their French colonizers as weak. Thus, the formation of the Istiqlal party, which 
translates to “independence” in Arabic, called for the independence of Morocco and dismantling 
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the French protectorate. Nationalists believed that the “demand for the abrogation of the 
protectorate treaty and a move towards independence” would be the new strategy for the 
nationalist party.39 
 One important figure of the Istiqlal party was its president, Allal El-Fassi. Born in Fes in 
1910, El-Fassi’s determination toward demolish French colonialism in Morocco gained major 
support considering his Islamic centrist ideologies. El-Fassi’s speeches and writings set the stage 
for Moroccan nationalist sovereignty with his idea of “Greater Morocco.” This movement, which 
became the central framework for the Istiqlal party, did not exclusively call for dismantling the 
French protectorate: 
 Allal El-Fassi illustrated his idea of Greater Morocco in accordance to which the 
 historic and national borders of the Kingdom extended to Senegal and to Niger, 
 including not only the Algerian regions of Colomb-Béchar and Tindouf and the 
 entire Mauritanian territory, but also the total possession of the Spanish Sahara.40 
 
 Toward the end of French colonization, El-Fassi published this new nationalist discourse 
in the Istiqlal ran newspaper Al-Alam, calling for all Moroccans to stand against French 
colonialism and promote this newly recognized modern state of Morocco.41 One year later, King 
Mohammed V adapted El-Fassi’s ideology and utilizing the theme of nationalist expansion by 
“recovering the territorial integrity of the lands that had acknowledged the sovereignty of his 
forefathers.”42 Once the nationalist discourse was set into practice after its quest for Spanish 
enclaves in the north and Western Sahara in the south, the Istiqlal party—originally a nationalist 
party to oust French colonialism—used the Greater Morocco ideology as to form a nationalist 
identity which was used as the discourse for Moroccan sovereignty. 
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 This is not to say that all Moroccans have or had similar nationalist ideologies. Mehdi 
Ben Barka, founder of the National Union of Popular Forces, did not share the nationalist 
discourse of Greater Morocco. Instead, he “demanded a clear position concerning our occupied 
territories in Western Sahara.”43 However, it was his questioning of the sovereignty that led to 
his assassination in Paris, illustrating the implementation of the Istiqlal claims to Greater 
Morocco. 
 By using Anderson’s interpretation of nationalism and correlating it to the idea of Greater 
Morocco, it allows the ability to understand how this nationalist discourse was constructed. This 
discourse ironically does not consider the practices and norms of international and humanitarian 
law, considering that the nationalists prior to independence felt “that in the emerging post war 
order, colonial administrations…would be anachronistic and obsolete.”44 This discourse 
illustrates the true effects of power and how power can be abused. 
 
Power and Abuse 
 Power is thus gained through the state which justifies the use of violence in order to 
monopolize violence. It is important to consider Weber’s definition of the state. Morocco 
continues to justify its means of violence by proclaiming its rightful use to the territory of 
Western Sahara. The ability to control the monopolization of violence within a given territory 
can easily be defined as a characteristic of power. This gives the ability for theorists to define 
power in their perspectives through objectivity or subjectivity. 
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 Although politicians and world leaders measure power through tangible means,45 it does 
not address how this ideological power is obtained. This theory of power is famously annotated 
by critical theorist and sociologist Karl Marx. Marx developed the theory of power by critiquing 
the capitalist system. He suggests that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles.”46 The bourgeoisie, or the higher class, controls the means of capital for seeking 
surplus value. By using the proletariat, the working class, the bourgeoisie is able to further seek 
this surplus value. 
 This suggests that those who are able to maintain this system of capital can obtain a sense 
of power within a state. In correlation with Weber, Marx explains the purpose of the executive 
modern state as “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie…Each 
step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political 
advance of that class.”47 This may not suggest that violence is an occurrence and obligatory for 
state power like Weber, but it does portray how trade transformed into this sense of “cash value” 
within the state. Thus, with those in control of this new phenomenon, power is obtained by the 
bourgeoisie who are able to exploit the common worker through “naked, shameless, direct, 
brutal, exploitation.”48 
 Marx’s critique of capital influenced many critical thinkers and sociologists. His 
definition of power is highly important for the purpose of this study; it defines how the rich and 
powerful are able to maintain their control of lower-class populations, especially for countries in 
the modern epoch. Marx gives a new perspective of power, thus allowing theorists to develop 
ideologies corresponding to the bourgeoisie and proletariat class structures. 
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 Those that obtain capital are capable of exporting their means of capital interest—
exploitation in Marxist’s view—into either neighboring states or weaker states. This framework 
allows us to understand that those with a substantial amount of capital can obtain a substantial 
amount of power and be able to use such power for their own benefit. Mirroring a Marxist 
theoretical framework, Vladimir Lenin defines imperialism as “monopolies of finance capital 
seeking other sectors of the world to expand their capital elsewhere for the benefit of their 
nation.”49 
 Lenin’s Marxist perspective defines power by explaining the Western states’ capabilities 
of taking advantage of “backward countries” through finance capital.50 Considering the price of 
land is low, raw materials are cheap, and wages are low, countries with a large amount of capital 
are able to take advantage of less privileged states.51 Export capital becomes relevant when 
“capitalism has become overripe,” and it thus must need to expand.52 
 Examining this theory of power has relevancy in the case of Western Sahara. Power in 
the perspective of capitalists seeking to export its capital to lesser privileged societies is 
recognized in the Mohammed VI’s continued ambition to annex Morocco. Yet, prior to its 
invasion of Western Sahara in 1975: 
 Morocco was already the world’s permanent exporter of phosphates, which 
 among other uses, is a key ingredient for modern agriculture. Morocco has 11 
 billion tons in working phosphate reserves and potentially 58 billion more. 
 Addition of the Western Sahara’s high grade deposits only slightly enhanced 
 Morocco’s already dominant position in the world market.53 
 
 Needless to say, Morocco’s ambition to annex Western Sahara did not originally lie in 
the aims of exploiting phosphates. The pursuance of annexation was a response to continued 
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attempts and threats of a coup within the Kingdom. It was not until the beginning of the 21st 
century that enabled Mohammed VI’s ambition for exploiting phosphates and fisheries to 
importers in both Europe and the United States. Therefore, a nationalist state expresses their 
power through expanding capital to more vulnerable states. 
 It is important to note the definition of imperialism given by Lenin, as it explains how a 
wealthy nation desires more surplus value. It is in that context which explains how wealthy 
nations (or in some cases more privileged ones) seek more for themselves and justify their 
actions by any means necessary. Wealthier nations seeking more profit will aim to exploit 
vulnerable and defenseless nations. Thus, the use of hegemony and coercion are examined. 
 
Gramsci and Hegemony 
 The theory of modern power started through the development of the state and its given 
borders. It was then elaborated through a critique of capitalist society, in which this theoretical 
perspective was eventually practiced within the state of a newly found Russia in the early 1900s. 
However, Marxist theory does not include the political scheme as an entity of power. It only 
critiques the use of those who have capital as a means of losing human dignity in substitute for 
cash exchange-value. Therefore, more room was needed in incorporating the state and civil 
society. 
 Gramsci contributes to the theory of power by discussing who it is that is powerful. 
Stemming from his Marxist beliefs, Gramsci begins by defining the intellect, which he suggests 
is not “a distinct social category independent of class.”54 He believes that “all mean are 
potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are 
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intellectuals by social function.”55 The hegemony functions as “the apparatus of state coercive 
power which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not consent either actively or 
passively.”56 
 Gramsci set the stage for future theorists to further elaborate on states that fall into this 
category of hegemony. By elaborating Machiavelli’s famous piece of work The Prince, Gramsci 
constructs the theory of how states are using this practice to govern others around them. It 
beautifully adds to the theory of power and states’ ability to conquer without true justification. 
Although Morocco is not a superpower, it does demonstrate hegemonic characteristics. Through 
the combination of state and civil society, Morocco’s infamous Green March in 1975 illustrates 
the beginning of domination and occupation in Western Sahara. King Hassan II was able to 
exercise the domination of territory through its society. Relying on faulty cultural history is not a 
reasonable use of coercion. According to the UN Charter, this is a violation of Article 2 (4), 
stating that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”57 
  By adding to Marx’s and Lenin’s theory of power through capitalism, Gramsci interprets 
the themes of power by including the importance of state and civil society. How states maintain 
that power and usage in the modern epoch influenced theorists to examine this perspective. Thus, 
the theory of neorealism was established. 
 
Neorealism and Power 
 The concepts of power have been elaborated through critiques of the global capitalist 
system. It examines those with the upper-hand making decisions for their benefit of surplus 
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value. However, adding the concept of Gramsci’s hegemony led to a simple one line definition 
of power given by Joseph Nye: “The ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not 
do.”58 
 This simple definition leaves unanswered questions for measuring power. Nye elaborates 
that measuring tangible power is common entity for political world leaders. For example, the 
state’s possession of resources, such as its military size, population, economic size, political 
stability, and territory define the capabilities of a state’s power.59 In correlation with Gramsci, 
the quantity of these resources gives the characteristics for states to use coercion. 
 However, Nye does not focus solely on quantity of these resources, but how the mindset 
of the state works. For instance:  
 A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other 
 countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
 prosperity and openness—want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to 
 set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to 
 change by threatening military force or economic sanctions.60 
 
Nye considers this hegemonic theory as “soft power,” which means “getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want.”61 However, Nye shifts away from acknowledging the importance of 
who gained power by only focusing on the behavior of power. Nye’s simplistic definition of 
power is still relevant in Moroccan occupation. Regardless of opposition, the Kingdom still 
maintains its occupation and attempts to monopolize violence through their control. 
 Neorealist theorists eventually started to examine how power has been maintained after 
the effects of the Cold War. Theorists, such as T.V. Paul, added to the already evolving theory of 
power by suggesting the idea of “power balancing,” which is loosely defined as states seeking to 
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survive as “independent entities” as well as seeking power in an anarchical global system.62 
 There three types of power balancing within states: hard, soft, and asymmetric. Hard 
balancing is described as a “strategy often exhibited by states…to build and update their military 
capabilities, as well as create and maintain formal alliances.”63 Soft balancing “occurs when 
states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance 
a potentially threatening state or a rising power.”64 Last, asymmetric balancing demonstrates 
“efforts by nation-states to balance and contain indirect threats posed by subnational actors.”65 
 This theory of power suggests that states only form alliances to strengthen their power. 
Thus, states forming alliances through this perspective suggests that it is only power that drives 
these states to balance amongst one another. Paul does not examine the cultural, historical, and 
personal alliances that are formed within states. For instance, the Alawi Dynasty in Morocco was 
the first country to recognize the United States as an independent nation in 1777.66 This act 
forever tightened the relations between the United States and Morocco. From letting allied forces 
landing in Casablanca during WWII to the Alawi Dynasty shaping itself toward Washington’s 
interests, “Morocco became [a] key [ally for] U.S. policies in the Middle East & Africa, and also 
helped implement them.”67 
 Regardless, using Paul’s explanation of “hard power” describes the relationship between 
the United States and Morocco during the sixteen year conflict in Western Sahara. The United 
States provided “significant political, economic, and military support for Morocco’s war 
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effort.”68  Little support was given “for a negotiated settlement.” This alliance was not for 
balancing against a rising power, but more so using power as a means of domination. It was 
further emphasized during the Reagan administration from the American ambassador Joseph 
Reed, a good friend of King Hassan II: 
 The United States is a true friend of Morocco. The leadership of the Reagan 
 Administration has stated that your country’s concerns are my country’s concerns. 
 The United States will do its best to be helpful in every area of need that may 
 arise. Count on us. We are with you.69 
 
 The theory of power transforms by examining states’ actions and reasoning behind them. 
Weber mentioned the ability to use violence within the state, but did not address how this power 
has been obtained. Examining his theory of the state relates to how power has been transformed 
historically. Marx’s critique of capitalism gave headway for theorists to develop their own 
perspectives of power, allowing the theory to expand beyond capital. It is important to recognize 
how power has transformed throughout the years because states that are considered tangibly 
powerless may in fact carry out the behavioral aspects of a powerful state. Thus, conflict and the 
theory of power go hand-in-hand with each other. 
Conflict and Violence 
 The concept of power correlates with how conflict begins. Once military war begins, the 
objective is to destroy the other enemy’s army and occupation of their territory.70 When this is 
accomplished, the result is “peace”. This includes the ability for the victorious army that “could” 
occupy another territory once this defeated enemy’s army is no longer capable of continuing this 
fight.71 
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 However, this definition of war between nations differs in terms of hegemonic powers. It 
is suggested that “political struggle is enormously more complex: in a certain sense, it can be 
compared to colonial wars or to old wars of conquest—which the victorious army  occupies, or 
proposes to occupy, all or a part of the conquered territory.”72 Political struggle is therefore 
relevant during the colonization period. In some cases, colonization is relevant in this modern 
epoch. 
 Yet, the drive for war does not always attempt to benefit the state. It can be suggested 
that “wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressiveness impulses, from stupidity.”73 
This view of conflict and war focuses on the individual’s quest for power and not necessarily for 
the benefit of the state entirely. The justification for this violence is argued that states have “not 
attained its ‘natural’ frontiers, which such frontiers are necessary to its security, that war [is] to 
extend the state to its deserved compass is justified or even necessary.”74 This perspective 
particularly aims at examining the drive for domination sought out by authoritarian regimes. 
 Another form of conflict or war can derive from the political issue or standpoint that a 
conflict revolves around. The actor(s) involved within the conflict: 
 Seeks to destroy the structure of their relations by undoing the other regime and, 
 in some cases, by displacing its people. Structural struggles spawn strategies of 
 resolute contention; at least one party decides that he will persist in the struggle 
 even should this mean his own destruction. Bargaining becomes impossible, and 
 the conflict becomes the communication.75 
 
 This furthers the definition of conflict given by Gramsci. It affirms political struggle as a 
conflict emerged from hegemonies as well as a drive for political dominance within another 
nation due to selfishness. This drive for political dominance is not necessarily a result from 
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capital’s continued quest for surplus value, as suggested by Marxists. Although it relates with 
each other by stating both are seeking dominance over one another, the context of why a state 
dominates another is distinct. 
 As mentioned above, violence is obtained through an individual’s selfishness, stupidity, 
and misguided perspectives. Furthermore, states attempt to justify the means of conflict and 
violence which is a characteristic of exercising power. This theoretical perspective of power 
usage relates to King Hassan II’s stubbornness. As a result, “Morocco started to make 
considerable investments, to encourage its citizens to settle in the Western Sahara and to almost 
double the size of its armed forces”76 by 1975. 
 Morocco’s use of its power through political conflict began to act as if communication 
was not an option anymore: 
 Convinced of Morocco’s claims to the territory, King Hassan viewed Saharawi 
 nationalists as Moroccan secessionists sponsored by the Algerian government. 
 Hence, he refused to accept the question of the Western Sahara as a 
 decolonization issue or to agree to direct talks with Polisario.77 
 
 Political drive for dominance can correlate with imperialist capitalism. It is often 
suggested that both are in fact a driving force for warfare and political struggle. Thus, both 
attributes of conflict can result to colonialism. 
 
Colonialism 
 As Gramsci suggests, political struggle from hegemonic states can be easily compared 
and related to colonialism. This historical conquest of Western states colonizing less 
underprivileged nations is the historical backbone to defining how a state is able to function. By 
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means of conflict and dominance, the effect of colonialism is possibly the best explanation of 
how power can be executed. 
 Colonialism was justified by the global North as a means to modernize lesser privileged 
societies. It is believed that a colonizer’s duty is to spread the beliefs and advancements in an 
upper-class society to an underprivileged one. This sense of Social Darwinism was practiced for 
decades. However, this “duty” for colonization did not portray the positive outcomes that 
colonizers stated they would aim for. Instead, colonization painted another picture: 
 The decisive actors here are the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer 
 and the ship owner, the gold digger and the merchant, appetite and force, and 
 behind them, the baleful projected shadow of a form of civilization which, at a 
 certain point in its history, finds itself obliged, for internal reasons, to extend to a 
 world scale of competition of its antagonistic economies.78 
 
In other words, civilizations were forced “to do what they otherwise would not do.”79 It is within 
this context that colonialism cannot and will not exist without the powerful means to do so. 
Regardless of how power is measured, it is the behavior of power that matters the most. 
 Colonialism’s effect on indigenous civilizations created a political and identity struggle. 
As colonizers begin to occupy territories within the nation, colonized populations begin to adapt 
lifestyles unfamiliar to their standards. This relates to Fanon’s theory of the Negro and 
psychopathology. Fanon explains the psychopathological effects of colonialism by illustrating 
scenarios many colonized populations go through. “A normal negro child, having grown up in a 
normal negro family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact of the white world.”80 
 The effects of colonialism derive from the selfishness of individuals and their revolving 
political ideologies within conflict as well as the upper-elite expanding their means of capital 
into “backward nations.” As the Moroccan government continues its occupation, the 
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characteristics of Morocco’s force into the region are a tool of colonialism. The political struggle 
continues for Saharawi people as they live under unwanted Moroccan sovereignty. This struggle 
not only includes Saharawis living under an unjust regime, but also identifying themselves as 
Saharawis. It is difficult for Saharwis, who are raised in Saharawi families, to live in a Moroccan 
lifestyle and struggle with identifying themselves as Moroccan, which they are not. One relevant 
solution for Saharwis to withstand this oppression is by revolt. Fanon dives further into this 
mindset by examining Algeria’s experience under French colonialism: 
 France will make peace in Algeria by strengthening its domination over Algeria 
 or by smashing the European feudal interests in Algeria. Apart from these two 
 solutions, peace will have to be imposed upon it internationally through the 
 agency of the UN or militarily by the Algerian forces.81 
 
 By examining strategies taken by both Saharawi activists as well as Moroccan forces, the 
occupation is a resemblance of colonialism. Saharawi activists continue to protest the occupation 
movement, but it is continuously dispersed through violent actions carried out by Moroccan 
forces.82  
 Yet, Saharawi identity is empowered through the vision of the Polisario Front on the 
ground, and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the Tindouf refugee camps. 
This discourse uses egalitarian methods to promote Saharawi identity. For instance, women in 
occupied Western Sahara are subjected to sexual humiliation and the threat of rape and death.83 
However, women are the driving force for Saharawi recognition in the face of colonialism while 
in the camps and abroad. The Polisario’s strategy of gender equality aims to “reinforce what it 
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means to be Saharawi in the face of Morocco.”84 The social structure established in Western 
Sahara portrays women as the representatives of “democracy, freedom, and equality.”85 Yet, the 
reinforcement of social patriarchy is observed when women living in occupied territories face 
rape and sexual humiliation, especially for teenagers such as Hayat Erguibi, who was nineteen 
years-old when she was tortured and faced with the threat of rape and death because of her 
outspoken actions against Morocco.86 
 
How This Study Will Add To the Literature 
 Furthering the study on the Moroccan and Western Saharan conflict justifies the themes 
of power mentioned above. Examining this study further will contribute to the study of power 
and colonialism. Furthermore, it will also bring a new theme of power by adding the Western 
states’ cooperation for occupation and colonialism. For instance, literature has been based on 
power balancing against the threats of rising powers. As mentioned above, this does not address 
the cultural and historical background to why these nations have allied. This will construct 
theories on the need for states to support others in times of conflict. As opposed to hopeful gains 
from the outcomes of conflict, states may just support each other because of their long historical 
relationships. 
 Literature has been conducted exclusively on this specific conflict. Stephen Zunes and 
Yahia Zoubir have elaborated extensive research on Morocco’s occupation within the Western 
Sahara. Both authors have included the United States’ influence and motivational support 
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throughout Western Sahara’s history. This particular study will further examine U.S. foreign 
policy in practice through examining their power influence. 
 Furthermore, this will add a sociological and anthropological perspective in the study of 
conflict, colonialism, and power. Theorists such as Frantz Fanon and Aime-Césaire have already 
included sociological perspectives of those being colonized and the colonizer. Such studies have 
been lightly examined within the Moroccan/Western Saharan conflict. It is important to realize 
the effects colonialism has through an anthropological lens. 
 By exploring the literature, it is now possible to understand how power can function, 
what the motives are for those in power, and how that power is used. This will further explain 
why Morocco has not taken the initiative of undergoing peace talks or settlement deals within the 
occupied territories. It will also explain the historical background of the United States’ influence 
in Morocco’s continued occupation. It does not, however, justify the means of violence 
committed by Moroccan forces. Although those in power may justify their actions as a threat to 
their national security, it only reflects how power is abused, justifying the violent means of their 
nature. 
 
Human Rights and International Law 
 Throughout the duration of the conflict, Morocco has and continues to disregard human 
rights treaties and international law to which they are obligated to comply. Civilian casualties 
continue to increase and the abuses continue to go unnoticed within the Western nations due to 
political alliances with the king. It is important to recognize the violations of the conflict as 
multiple crimes have been committed for the sake of national assimilation. 
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 While examining the case of Western Sahara, these violations of international and human 
rights laws parallel the occupation of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is a powerful 
nation, strongly supported by other powerful Western states, which continues to pursue national 
integration of a weaker state because of their legal and ethnic claims to the region. This section 
aims to portray the significance of the conflict through a legal understanding. 
 First is to examine the significance of the Moroccan invasion. By doing so, I look at the 
ICJ advisory opinion between Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. This will show the legal 
reasoning behind the advisory opinion and why Morocco’s invasion through the Green March is 
considered illegal. It will then lead to an examination of the illegality of the Madrid Accords 
signed in 1975 and passing colonization from Spain to Morocco. 
 Second, I will examine the peace process from 1991-2004. The actions Morocco took in 
refusing to live up to its obligations under the peace process signify multiple violations of 
international law. Finally, I will present subsequent testimonies from those in occupied territories 
as well as in proper Morocco who have undergone multiple experiences of torture while under 
Moroccan detention. These testimonies may be graphic, but it is a daily occurrence for those who 
identify with the Saharawi cause and for those in occupied territories. 
 
The Question of Sovereignty 
 After Resolution 2983 was adopted in the UN General Assembly, which “reaffirms the 
inalienable right of the people of the Sahara the right to self-determination and independence in 
accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514,”87 Spain began the process of 
decolonization from its Saharan territory. After finally hearing this miraculous breakthrough for 
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one of Africa’s last colonies, King Hassan II began to initiate claims for expanding his 
nationalist aspirations. 
 Hassan’s leadership was appearing to look weak. Results of high unemployment, 
increased poverty, and a staggering illiteracy rate lowered support from both within his regime 
and among the general public. It was then after the first attempted coup d’état that led to 
Hassan’s fear of losing power. His regime “executed ten officers and imprisoned a thousand 
others” after the first failed attempt.88 The second failed attempt was from an attempted hijacking 
after departing from France from his own air force. This led to the suicide of his closest 
associate, minister of defense General Mohammed Oufkir, when it became known that Oufkir 
was responsible for the attempted coup.89 After a third plot was foiled, executing 16 conspirators, 
it was obvious Hassan’s sovereignty was under threat. The perfect opportunity to prove his 
strength was through the annexation of Western Sahara. 
 With what he saw as an opportunity to save his reign, Hassan quickly addressed 
Morocco’s legal claims to Western Sahara. Backed by Mauritania, with similar claims to the 
territory, Morocco requested the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on Spain’s 
control of Moroccan territory since its colonization in 1885.90 Spain, however, requested the 
court to have a non-binding advisory opinion with respect to the UN Charter and various 
resolutions which respect Saharawi decolonization and self-determination. After the request was 
passed by the General Assembly, the following questions were asked to be considered for the 
court: 
 1) Was the Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of 
 colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? 
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 2) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, what were the legal ties 
 between this territory and the King of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? 
 
Morocco’s Legal Claims 
 According to Jacob Mundy, Morocco’s case for its sovereignty of Western Sahara 
included four focal points. First was the claim of immemorial possession. Second was based on 
geographical continuity. The third claimed for an internal display of autonomy, and finally the 
external display of autonomy. 
 First and foremost, Morocco claimed the territory of Western Sahara as immemorial 
possession, “dating from the [Arab] conquest of North Africa over thirteen hundred years 
earlier.”91 Secondly, their claim for geographical continuity was cited from an ICJ precedent of 
the “Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,” which legally allowed Denmark sovereignty of the 
uncontrolled territory.92 
 Morocco’s more focal points in their claim to the territory were on the internal and 
external claims. They began with the claim of the Sherifian State, meaning that “whether or not 
certain social groups fell under the direct control of the central power of the Sultan” and that “all 
groups acknowledged his ‘spiritual authority’.”93 They tried explaining how the territory “has 
always been linked to the interior of Morocco by common ethnological, cultural, and religious 
ties” as well as claiming allegiance “between the Moroccan Sultan and certain Saharan 
leaders…whose ranges traditionally spread from the region of the Nun River in Southern 
Morocco to the Saqiyah al-Hamra region in Western Sahara.”94 
 Morocco attempted to further extend their internal claims through individuals visiting the 
territory promoting Moroccan sovereignty. They began with Shakh Ma al-Aynayn, who “became 
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the personal representative of the Moroccan Sultan in the late nineteenth century and led 
resistance movements against colonial domination.”95 Later, they noted King Hassan I’s personal 
visit to the territory in 1882 and 1886, “where some Saharan tribes reaffirmed their ties of 
allegiance to the Sultan.”96 
 Eventually, this led to their fourth and final claim by illustrating external recognition of 
Morocco’s sovereignty in Western Sahara. First, they attempted to present a treaty between 
Great Britain and Morocco, “which pertained to the lands between the Dra’a river and Cape 
Boujdour” as well as the Anglo-Moroccan agreement of 1895, claiming “British recognition of 
the Sultan’s authority as far south as Cape Boujdour in Western Sahara.”97 
 Morocco then explained Spanish recognition of Moroccan sovereignty with the 1767 
Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of Marrakesh, which “recognized the Moroccan Sultan’s ability to 
have the power to take decisions with respect to the Wad Noun and beyond.”98 Furthermore, they 
attempted to bring evidence from the Hispano-Moroccan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 
1861, claiming that “article 38 was explicit Spanish recognition of the Sultan’s sovereignty over 
Saharan tribes.”99 According to Morocco, Article 38 explicitly states: 
 If a Spanish vessel be wrecked at Wad Noun or on any other part of its coast, the 
 Sultan of Morocco shall make use of his authority to save and protect the master 
 and crew until they return to their country, and the Spanish Consul-General, 
 Consul, Vice-Consul, Consular Agent, or person appointed by them shall be 
 allowed to collect every information they may require100 
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According to Morocco, this document affirms their recognition of sovereignty through the 
recovery of the Esmerelda, a Spanish fishing vessel consisting of nine sailors which was 
captured by “Moors of the frontier coast” in 1863.101 
 Finally, Morocco argued with the 1911 Franco-German agreement, signifying that the 
region of Saqiyah al-Hamra, regardless “if Rio de Oro (southern Western Sahara) fell outside” of 
Morocco’s original claims to the region.102 
 
ICJ Response and Official Ruling 
 After arguments presented by Morocco, along with statements from both Spain and 
Mauritania, the court responded that Morocco provided insufficient evidence that did not 
confirm national sovereignty over the territory. The court’s decision, albeit ignored by Morocco 
just weeks after, provided the opinion that would legally nullify such claims over Western 
Sahara. 
 The court responded to the first question, stating that “the information furnished to the 
court shows that at the time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if 
nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to 
represent them.”103 Evidence backing this claim by the court is an important legal document 
from Spain: 
 In its Royal Order of 26 December, 1884, far from treating the case as one of 
 occupation of terra nullius, Spain proclaimed that the King [of Spain] was taking 
 Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of agreements which had been 
 entered into with the chiefs of the local tribe…“the documents which the 
 independent tribes of this part of the coast” had signed with “the representative of 
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 the Sociedad Espanola de Africanistas,” and announced that the King had 
 confirmed “the deeds of adherence” to Spain.104 
 
 In light of the documents presented by Spain from 1884, this illustrates that the territory 
was not considered to be terra nullius. However, the case given by Morocco seemed insufficient, 
dooming the legality of Morocco’s claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara. 
 The court acknowledged Morocco’s historical claims through the Arab conquest period 
nearly thirteen centuries earlier. However, the court responded that the “far-flung, spasmodic and 
often transitory character of many of these events renders the historical material somewhat 
equivocal as evidence of possession of the territory now in question.”105 
 In response to the “Legal Status of Eastern Greenland” precedent, the court stated that 
there are major differences between the legal claims of Western Sahara and Eastern Greenland. 
The court rendered, in comparison to the two aforementioned territories, that Western Sahara 
“was a territory across which socially and political organized tribes were in constant movement 
and where armed incidents between these tribes were frequent.”106 According to the court, 
Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara with insufficient evidence was considered a 
difficulty for a claim to sovereignty today. 
 Responding to Morocco’s claims of the Sherifian State, the court did not find this 
considerable evidence to be sufficient. The court stated that the territories loyal to the Sultan did 
not govern territories de facto of said loyalty: 
 [Western Sahara] did not contribute contingents to the Sherifian army; no taxes 
 were collected there…the government of the people was in the hands of caids 
 appointed by the tribes, and their powers were derived more from the 
 acquiescence of the tribes than from any delegation of author by the Sultan…It is 
 also said that the historical evidence shows the territory between the Souss and 
 the Dra’a to have been in a state of permanent insubordination…and that this 
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 implies that there was no effective and continuous display of State functions even 
 in those areas to the North of Western Sahara.107 
 
 Referring to Spain’s documents, the court disregarded Morocco’s claim for Ma al-
Aynayn as a representative to the Sultan in Western Sahara. According to Spain, Ma al-Aynayn 
was not a representative to the Sultan in Western Sahara. Instead, al-Aynayn 
 [E]xercised his authority to the south of the Dra’a in complete independence of 
 the Sultan; his relations with the Sultan were based on mutual respect and a 
 common interest in resisting French expansion from the south; they were relations 
 of equality, not political ties of allegiance or of sovereignty.108 
 
The court further disregarded King Hassan I’s visit as an expression of sovereignty, stating that 
“the expeditions of Sultan Hassan I to the south in 1882 and 1886 both had objects specifically 
directed to the Souss and the Noun and, in fact, did not go beyond the Noun, so that they did not 
reach even as far as the Dra’a, still less Western Sahara.”109 
 After examining Morocco’s external claims to the territory, the court also considered this 
as insufficient evidence. Morocco referring to the Anglo-Moroccan Agreement of 1895 was 
deemed by the Court as illegitimate translation of the treaty. As the Court received the original 
documents from Great Britain, the document did not refer to recognition below the Dra’a: 
 [T]he provisions of the 1895 treaty invoked by Morocco appear to the Court to 
 represent an agreement by Great Britain not to question in future any pretensions 
 of the Sultan to the lands between the Dra’a and Cape Bojador, and not a 
 recognition by Great Britain of previously existing Moroccan sovereignty over 
 those lands. In short, what those provisions yielded to the Sultan was acceptance 
 by Great Britain not of his existing sovereignty but of his interest in that area.110 
 
 Referring to the Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of Marrakesh in 1767, the Court confirmed 
that the treaty’s purpose was to deny responsibility of actions by fishers in the southern coasts of 
Western Sahara. Morocco’s translation to said treaty states the Sultan’s refusal of recognizing the 
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maltreatment of Spaniards by the inhabiting Arabs of the territory. Spain’s translation, however, 
with equal authenticity, states the King’s refusal of recognizing the responsibility of Spaniard’s 
fishing expeditions, thus allowing fishing expeditions by Canary Island Spaniards and no other 
state.111 Furthermore, the Court also noted Morocco’s insufficient claims of the Treaty in 1861, 
as well as the Essmerelda incident in 1863. According to Spanish documents presented to the 
Court, the Treaty of 1861 was presented in two separate strategies in accordance to the 
insubordination of the Nun and Sous rivers. The first “provided for areas where the Sultan did 
exercise his authority and undertook to use his normal powers to protect the shipwrecked.”112 
The second was specific to the Nun River. “If a vessel were shipwrecked at the [Nun River] or 
beyond, the treaty provisions gave a different answer as to the duty of the Sultan.”113 Therefore, 
the Court stated that the Sultan: 
 [D]id not order or protect but undertook to try to liberate the shipwrecked persons 
 so far as he was able; and in order to do that he would use his influence with the 
 peoples neighboring on his realm and negotiate the ransoming of the sailors, 
 usually with the local authorities. It was not…a matter of his exercising his own 
 authority.114 
 
 In accordance to the Essmerelda incident, Spain presented to the Court official 
documents from the 1863 incident. It was not negotiated through the Sultan, as Morocco claims. 
Instead, Spanish documents state that the incident 
 [Does] not appear to warrant the conclusion that Spain thereby also recognized 
 the Sultan’s territorial sovereignty over that part of Western Sahara. The 
 documents, and the whole incident, appear rather to confirm the view that Article 
 38, and other similar provisions, concerned, instead, the exercise of the personal 
 authority or influence of the Sultan, through the Tekna caids of the [Nun River], 
 to negotiate the ransom of the shipwrecked sailors from the tribe holding them 
 captive to the south of the [Nun River].115 
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 Finally, the Court considered the Franco-German Agreement of 1911 difficult to 
incorporate claims of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Through a previous Spanish-
French Treaty of 1904, France recognized Spain’s colonization “outside the limits of Morocco.” 
It also confirms that the Franco-German 1911 Agreement was not in concern of Moroccan 
sovereignty, rather in concern for French and German relations, “not with the existing frontier of 
Morocco.” Therefore, the Court declared that 
 These agreements…are of limited value in this regard; for it was not their purpose 
 either to recognize an existing sovereignty over a territory or to deny its existence. 
 Their purpose, in their different contexts, was rather to recognize or reserve for 
 one or both parties a ‘sphere of influence’ as understood in the practice of that 
 time. In other words, one party granted to the other freedom of action in certain 
 defined areas, or promised non-interference in an area claimed by the other 
 party.116 
 
 After reviewing the aforementioned evidence proclaimed by Morocco and Mauritania, 
with regards to Spain as well, the Court concluded with the following statement: 
 [T]he materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of 
 territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom 
 of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the court has not found legal ties of 
 such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 in the 
 decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-
 determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples 
 of the territory.117 
 
 Thus, the Court ruled unanimously to the first question that Western Sahara was not 
considered terra nullius, a territory belonging to no one. The Court ruled against Morocco 14-2 
and against Mauritania 15-1, thus ruling in favor of self-determination. Although the 
aforementioned ruling is not legally binding, it thus portrays a legal framework for Western 
Sahara. Nonetheless, it was ignored. 
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The Invasion and the Madrid Accords 
 After the Green March was called back from three days of marching, Morocco’s military 
invaded the Western Saharan territory. Hassan II had disregarded the ICJ’s advisory opinion, 
based on a legal framework, and considered the ruling in his favor to annex Western Sahara. 
Besides disregarding the legal ruling, Morocco violates particular aspects of international law. 
 The invasion has violated multiple articles in the UN Charter, to which Morocco is 
bound, having ratified the Charter upon joining the United Nations following its independence in 
1956. One obvious violation of the UN Charter is Article 2 (4), which declares that member 
states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Regardless of Morocco’s argument for territorial 
claims, which may deter the international community from recognizing such violation, the ICJ’s 
ruling presents the sufficient evidence clarifying Morocco’s illegitimacy of sovereignty in 
Western Sahara. 
 One particular incident which continues to be overlooked is the illegality of the Madrid 
Accords in 1976. As mentioned earlier, Spain was undergoing a transition in power after 
Francisco Cuellar was diminishing in health. As the United States negotiated with Spain to 
rebuild American airbases (along with providing economic aid) for fear of losing Morocco as 
their geostrategic ally, this allowed the tripartite signing of the Madrid Accords, delivering 
administrative power from Spain into Morocco. 
 Although Spain officially withdrew from its colony, there is still a significant amount of 
responsibility for the former colonizer to maintain its stance on decolonizing Western Sahara. 
Passing administering power from one colonizer to a new colonizer does not constitute an act of 
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decolonization; therefore, Western Sahara is still recognized as a non-self-governing territory, 
the legal definition of a colony. Therefore, the Madrid Accords of 1976 violates General 
Assembly Resolution 1514, which declares the following: 
 1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
 constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the 
 United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
 cooperation. 
 2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
 freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and 
 cultural development. 
 
 In accordance to the aforementioned resolution and Article 2 of the UN Charter, 
Morocco’s military invasion and its infamous Green March are considerable violations of 
international law. Although the violations are obvious, the international community, including 
members of the Security Council, neglected to view this coercion as a violation of international 
law; an issue which I will go into further depth later. 
 
The Wall 
 James Baker, after his resignation from his Special Envoy post to Western Sahara, stated 
that the conflict between Morocco and Western Sahara “is really not unlike the Arab-Israeli 
dispute: two different peoples claiming the same land. One is very strong, one has won the war, 
one is in occupation and the other is very weak.”118 The attributes between these two very similar 
conflicts share one very important characteristic—one big wall. 
 The wall (or berm) in Western Sahara stretches 600 miles and is heavily guarded with 
barbed wire and “millions of mines”119 funded by French and American governments.120 With 
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similar building structures, Israel constructed the wall in Palestinian occupied territories that 
consisted of the following: 
1. A fence with electronic sensors 
2. A ditch (up to four meters deep) 
3. A two-lane asphalt patrol road 
4. A trace road (a strip of sand smoothed to detect footprints) running parallel to 
the fence 
5. A stack of six coils of barbed wire making the perimeter of the complex121 
 
Furthermore, the Israeli wall “has a width of 50 to 70 meters, increasing to as much as 100 
meters in some places.”122 
 Although both conflicts show striking similarities with each other, the legal questioning 
behind the construction of the wall in Israel was brought to the attention of the International 
Court of Justice in an advisory opinion in 2003, questioning the legality behind the wall and 
further legal consequences. Regardless if the ruling was non-binding, the court did establish a 
legal framework behind the illegality of constructing the wall. This advisory opinion relates to 
the same construction in Western Sahara. 
 The Court ruled 14-1 that Israel’s construction of the wall in the occupied territories of 
Palestine “has violated various international obligations incumbent to it.”123 One in particular is 
the General Assembly Resolution 2625, stating that: 
 The territory of a state shall not be the object of military occupation resulting 
 from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The 
 territory of a state shall not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting 
 from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat 
 or use of force shall be recognized as legal.124 
 
 The aforementioned resolution allows the understanding that occupation hinders the 
rights of others’ self-determination. Thus, the tool to use said occupation comes in the form of a 
                                                          
121
 ICJ Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 9, 
2004. 
122
 Ibid 
123
 Ibid 
124
 Resolution 2625, General Assembly, October 24, 1970 
45 
 
 
 
wall. This wall is thus preventing the freedom of movement of peoples in occupied territories. In 
regards to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—which the occupied parties 
have already violated in respect to Articles 1 & 2, promoting self-determination—the 
construction of the wall violates Article 12 (1), which calls for “the right to liberty of movement 
and freedom to choose his residence” within that territory.125 Similarly, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights proclaims the right to self-determination 
under Article 1. The occupation and the characteristics that come with it directly violate this 
right. 
 The construction of the wall also violates Article 35 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, which states that “all protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset 
of, or during, a conflict, shall be entitled to do so.”126 Furthermore, Article 48 of the same 
conventions illustrates the following: 
 Protected persons who are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied, 
 may avail themselves of the right to leave the territory subject to the provisions of 
 Article 35, and decisions thereon shall be taken according to the procedure which 
 the Occupying Power shall establish in accordance with the said Article.127 
 
 It was with this international legal framework in which the Court deemed the wall in 
occupied Palestinian territories illegal. Thus, the 1980 construction of the wall in Western Sahara 
portrays the same actions and the same violations of international law. Unfortunately, the 
political motivation behind the Western Saharan conflict continues to neglect the illegality of this 
demoralizing construction. 
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Social Integration: 1990-Today 
 After the ceasefire in 1988, the UN established MINURSO to mandate the ceasefire 
agreement as well as initiate the first peace installment in 1990. During this process, both parties 
agreed to a referendum in which voters would choose between either integration or 
independence. MINURSO’s objective was to oversee the voter registration process. The outcome 
had serious setbacks to the peace process altogether. 
 Both parties also agreed that only ethnic Saharawis native to the territory were allowed to 
vote. However, it was difficult to perceive individuals who had ethnic ties to the territory and 
who were deemed ethnic Saharawis. Polisario originally requested that voters must consist of the 
1974 Spanish census, estimating to around 74,000 people. However, Morocco had double the 
amount, which “present[s] prointegration [of] Moroccans as native Western Saharans.”128 
 This particular move of Moroccan citizens into a militarized occupied territory is thus a 
violation of Article 49 in the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, which states that an 
“individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied 
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, 
are prohibited, regardless of their motive”129 and thus if said transfers take place, then “the 
Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken 
place.”130 Considering this difficulty and increasing the margin in favor of Morocco, the voting 
registration thus broke down. 
 Moroccan civilians integrating in Western Sahara portrays the objective of nationalist 
expansion and annexation, which is deemed illegal in various forms mentioned above. The 
illegality behind Morocco’s annexation portrays the anxiety of losing the Kingdom’s own 
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sovereignty of proper Morocco. Thus, illegal actions are taken in order to maintain one’s own 
power. This power is nonetheless abused in occupied territories and thus its citizens feel the 
damage the most. 
 
Torture 
 One common trait seen in occupied Western Sahara is torture. Most of these actions have 
taken place either through kidnapping, false imprisonment, or detention of nonviolent protestors 
in the region. The following examines three testimonies—one in Southern Morocco and two in 
occupied Al-Laayoune—each telling their experiences of torture from Moroccan officers for 
sympathizing the ideas of self-determination and Western Saharan independence. These 
testimonies, taken from human rights organizations, can be quite graphic, but are common 
occurrences in Western Sahara. 
Ngilla el-Hawasi and Zahra Amidane 
 Ngilla el-Hawasi and Zahara Amidane faced political torture and false imprisonment 
when attending a nonviolent protest in Laayoune, the capital city of occupied Western Sahara. 
Whilst protesting, a photojournalist was taking photos of the event, which eventually broke out 
into clashes between protestors and police officers, arresting nine protestors including Hawasi 
and Amidane.131 
 The police took both girls in separate areas. Hawasi was brought into an interrogation 
room where officers held her feet and arms while one officer started beating her with a water 
hose. While interrogating her about her knowledge of the photographer earlier in the 
demonstrations, he continued beating her when she responded that she didn’t know who he was. 
Afterward, Hawasi’s face was slammed into metal cabinets, resulting in her head bleeding and 
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left half-conscious. After she continued to negate knowing the journalist, they took her into a 
crowded and cold room with boys stripped down to only their shorts. They were left there 
overnight.132 
 Later, they took everyone in the cell for further questioning, with shoes being thrown at 
them. After repeatedly yelling for names of activists, the boys in the room began to urinate as 
they had no access to restroom facilities. Hawasi stated they were forced to clean up the mess 
with cardboard. They then took the girls into a separate room full of bikes and motorcycles, 
forcing them to clean the garage.133 
 Amidane underwent similar treatment. While being interrogated, they blindfolded her and 
tied her wrists behind her back and close to her knees, mimicking the rotisserie position. Police 
officers then began to beat her with their clubs after she responded that she had no knowledge of 
the photojournalist at the demonstration. They then threw her and another girl in a cell with other 
boys.134 
 Eventually, the parents in the afternoon came to pick them up with the police saying they 
are being filled with propaganda about self-determination. 
Naama Asfari 
 Naama Asfari is a Saharawi human rights activist who lives in France and travels 
frequently to Morocco and Western Sahara. He is Co-President of the Committee for the Respect 
of Freedoms and Human Rights in Western Sahara and a graduate from the University of 
Marrakech, studying law.135 Considering his role for the recognition of Western Sahara and an 
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ambiguous human rights activist in the region, he portrays a high target for police officers. This 
has resulted in numerous acts of unlawful imprisonment, unfair trials, and torture. 
 In one particular incident in April 2008, Asfari was meeting with Saharawi students at the 
University of Marrakech. During that week he was constantly being followed by unmarked 
police cars and “plainclothes” officers. One night, Asfari ran a red light nearly hitting another 
woman. Getting out of his car and apologizing, she continued to scream and drove off.136 
 Afterward, two police officers in normal clothes exited their car and walked over to 
Asfari’s car, ordering him to give them his keys and step out of the car. They walked him over to 
their car, sat him in the back seat, place a blindfold over his eyes, and handcuffed him behind his 
back. They first humiliated him, stating “you came here to help these separatists. Why don’t you 
just keep out of it?” When he tried to respond, the officers proceeded to punch him in the face.137 
 After the car stopped, they forced him out of the car, taking off his shirt and shoes and sat 
him in a chair while still being blindfolded. They un-cuffed his hands, put his arms around a tree 
trunk, then re-handcuffed them again making him unable to move. After refusing to answer 
questions to why he was in Marrakech due to the informal procedure of his interrogation, an 
officer kicked him in the stomach. Refusing to answer questions as to why he was talking to 
students, they proceeded to kick him in the chest in the cold.138 
 Two and-a-half hours passed after repeatedly beating him. Officers then decided to “try 
something else.” As he was seated, the officers lifted up his feet onto a second chair and used 
batons to beat the soles of his feet for two-three minutes to force a confession. Afterward, they 
took lit cigarettes and burnt them on his wrists. Asfari heard people walking by, but didn’t ask 
any questions. Instead, they would either insult or slap him in the face. Eventually, the police 
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drove him to the hospital to be examined. Asfari was then “charged” for drunk driving and 
hitting a car. He continued to testify that the interrogation was never based on the near driving 
collision and instead was a political motive, but was never acknowledged by the courts. Asfari 
also persistently showed his burns, scars, and brusies from the beating and requested a medical 
report from the hospital, but neither the court nor the hospital complied.139 
Hayat Erguibi 
 Hayat Erguibi was 19 years old from Laayoune when she was harassed.140 On February 
22, 2009, Erguibi was leaving her parents’ house when two police officers stopped her just 
outside. The police then handcuffed her and covered her face with a dirty cloth and escorted her 
into the police car where they began to beat her. The officers then took her outside of the city to 
a location in the desert.141 
 When they brought her outside, they proceeded to ask her about the graffiti on the walls 
in her neighborhood as well as pamphlets and flyers questioning the occupation and the 
Kingdom of Morocco. Although she denied any allegations to those particular events, she was 
continuously beaten all over her body with nightsticks, punches, and slaps. About fifteen minutes 
before she was released, they began to severely beat her leaving scars on her chest.142 
 Just after they stopped beating her, they discovered that she had some connections with a 
human rights activist in Western Sahara. They then began to strip off her clothes completely and 
began to enforce sexual humiliation and attempted rape. Afterward, they threatened her that if 
she ever testified this incident to any organization, they would kill and bury her in the desert 
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without anybody knowing. They threatened that similar actions would be taken toward her 
siblings and other members of her family.143 
 During her testimony, she admitted that she was not afraid and was encouraged to state 
that these actions were uncalled for. Erguibi also mentioned that these incidents are not 
uncommon and happen frequently amongst many young Saharawi women who are also too 
afraid to testify for the fear of death brought upon them. 
 These testimonies mentioned above are just few documented acts of torture that are 
committed amongst many Saharawis in both Western Sahara and Morocco by police forces. 
Multiple incidents similar to those mentioned above are committed throughout the country, but a 
sense of fear for further persecution or even death takes over due to serious previous experiences 
of torture. 
 Considering that torture is one of the most common human rights abuses throughout the 
world—which Morocco is surprisingly a signed party to a majority of treaties which prevent 
torture—I break down specific human rights laws relevant to the region. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment 
 Morocco has eagerly signed and ratified multiple conventions of human rights 
concerning torture. First, they signed the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, 
Degrading Treatment on January 8, 1986, and then ratified the same convention on June 21, 
1993, with no reservations.144 Within this convention lies the groundwork for what defines 
torture, which is stated in Article 1 (1): 
 For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which 
 severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
 person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
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 confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
 suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
 or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
 suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
 of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
 include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
 sanctions.145 
 
The definition stated by the convention is directly violated by Moroccan police forces against 
Saharawis and activists in occupied territories of Western Sahara and Morocco. The testimonies 
given above illustrate “intentionally inflicted” pain which they have suffered long-term marks 
and scars given to them by police forces to obtain information.  This also clears any confusion 
from the term “severe” as both victims have displayed scars or mental suffering from beatings 
and sexual humiliation. 
 Article 2 (2) of the same convention mentions the state’s role to prevent further acts of 
torture: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
torture.”146 Police officers interrogating Saharawis claim to have reason to be a threat to the 
monarchy and its “sovereignty” over Western Sahara. The testimonies mentioned above have 
stated that both victims were considered a threat to the monarchy due to their involvement in 
human rights organizations or nonviolent protests and are to be treated harshly. 
 Ironically, in 2006, Morocco announced in its penal code under Article 231(1) a more 
precise definition of torture, which is nearly identical to the Convention Against Torture: 
 Any act that causes severe physical or mental pain or suffering intentionally 
 inflicted by a public agent or upon his instigation or with his express or tacit 
 consent, upon a person for the purpose of intimidating or pressuring him or for 
 pressuring a third person, to obtain information or a confession, to punish him for 
 an act that he or a third party committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
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 when such pain or suffering is inflicted for any other objective based on any form 
 of discrimination.147 
 
Although Morocco has taken steps to implement the definition of torture into domestic law, 
“torture persists in Morocco in part because of a lack of political will to eradicate it.”148  Asfari’s 
testimony states he persistently requested a medical report along with showing the marks on his 
body, but the Moroccan courts or officials did not budge. Disregarding Asfari’s obvious case of 
torture by police officers violates Article 2 (1) of the Convention Against Torture which states 
that “each state party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”149 
 The CAT strictly focuses on what defines torture and encourages states to take steps 
toward eliminating it. Morocco has continuously neglected an important factor of human rights 
which most people consider a high priority regarding human rights entirely. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 Morocco signed the ICCPR on January 19, 1977, and ratified the convention on May 3, 
1979, with no abstentions or reservations.150 Regarding both testimonies given by Erguibi and 
Asfari, the victims are protected by the ICCPR under Article 7 which states agree that “no one is 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”151 
 Considering the victims are being tortured during a time of conflict in Moroccan 
occupied territories of Western Sahara, torturing citizens which do not recognize Moroccan 
authority over the Saharawi people is a violation of Article 1 (1) of the ICCPR which allows “the 
right to self-determination.”152 A concept which has been violated since the Green March in 
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1975, Saharawi victims of torture are deprived of their exercising right to freely move 
economically, socially, and politically without fear of persecution. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was established as a guideline for countries 
to follow, considering the horrific aftermath of World War II. It calls for all nations to recognize 
the importance of human rights and how states can prevent further atrocities similar to those in 
WWII. It was the forefront of multiple conventions and treaties that have been composed of by 
the United Nations and treaties between certain parties. Specifically, it helped create the ICCPR 
and the CAT, both ratified by Morocco. 
 Morocco’s commitment to the UDHR has been stagnant. Article 5 is the forefront of 
CAT, bringing the importance that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”153 This article has been repeated in multiple treaties and 
even redefined in domestic law. In spite of this historical article, Moroccan forces have 
continued to use tactics of torture amongst Saharawi people. As mentioned earlier, the ongoing 
conflict in the occupied territories which result to Moroccan police officials torturing Saharawis 
hinder the free access of life and liberty. Saharawis, like all peoples, are born with rights to 
equality and freedom, which is stated under Articles 1 and 3 under the UDHR.154 
 Morocco is adamant on continuing its national integration in Western Sahara. 
Disregarding international law and human rights law, Saharawis are subject to cruel and 
degrading punishment for being Saharawi. Talks continue to take place within the UN and 
resolutions have been passed for Moroccans to withdraw from certain areas, but progress has not 
been made to secure Saharawis the access to life, liberty, equality, and self-determination. These 
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violations persisting for nearly 40 years continue to have little to no action from the United 
States and other important international actors. Recently elected as a member of the UN Human 
Rights Council155, Morocco sits at the center stage for promoting human rights and international 
law, which may lead them to international exposure. 
 
The United States 
 One of the longest lasting relationships the United States has had without any 
interference or dispute has been with the Kingdom of Morocco. Since Morocco’s recognition of 
the new state one year after writing the Declaration of Independence, the United States has kept 
its close ties with the Kingdom and plans to continue such a long lasting diplomatic relationship. 
 Reasoning behind this ongoing friendship is not based on Morocco being the first country 
to recognize The United States. Morocco has implemented Western ideologies within the 
Maghreb region and promotes pro-Western ideologies worldwide. From allowing air bases in 
Casablanca during World War II up to fighting modern day terrorism, the United States can 
always count on Morocco as an important geostrategic ally and influence the US’s foreign policy 
motives throughout Africa and the Middle East. 
 Such a history of friendship is also a history of US support for the Moroccan state and its 
policies domestically and internationally. The United States has stood behind Morocco during 
their illegal occupation of Western Sahara, continuing to lend massive amounts of military aid 
and loans to maintain control over the territory. Such history does not portray the support of a 
democratic institution. Instead, it supports an illegal occupation with countless human rights and 
international law abuses. 
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 This section will cover the history behind The United States’ long term support of 
Morocco’s occupation in Western Sahara. Beginning with the 1974 threat of the Green March, I 
will illustrate the United States’ role behind turning over Spanish administration to Morocco and 
Mauritania. Later, and most importantly, I illustrate the history of the arms trade between the 
Moroccan kingdom and the United States. From a close stagnation during the Carter 
administration to an astronomical increase during the Reagan administration, the United States 
has maintained its support toward their pro-Western ally with any forms of artillery to defeat 
“anti-Western” actors (an issue I draw on later). 
 By the end of the 1990s, the United States steered away from the referendum, portraying 
a decrease of interest during the peace process. However, the importance of both the Clinton and 
Bush administrations backing the kingdom’s position have led to failed peace attempts between 
Polisario and Morocco. Examining the reasoning behind this support will explain how the peace 
process has led to a staggering halt. 
 Finally, I address the little recognition which the Obama administration has given toward 
the conflict in Western Sahara. This will illustrate how power politics are continuing in the 
region as well as diminishing hope for peace to flourish in the region. 
 
The United States and the Invasion 
 The United States considered Morocco a geostrategic ally during the Cold War. Former 
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger framed the US foreign policy agenda in Morocco around 
the idea of a strong Moroccan state. Kissinger wanted to prevent “another Angola on the East 
flank of the Atlantic Ocean.”156 It was believed that “any lack of stability in the Sahara could 
well destabilize the entire Iberian peninsula…hav[ing] serious consequences on the United States 
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strategic interests in Spain.”157 Considering Hassan’s loyalty to Washington, Morocco would be 
a strong ally to lose during the midst of threatened coup attempts and perhaps a new Vietnam. 
Therefore, it was necessary to keep Hassan in power. 
 After the advisory opinion was announced, Hassan initiated his plan to invade Western 
Sahara through the infamous Green March. When Washington heard word of this, Kissinger 
warned Hassan to avoid the situation from escalation “and to let diplomacy take its course 
through the UN.”158 It was in Kissinger’s interest to assure that Western Sahara would be handed 
to Morocco. By doing so, Kissinger requested then Deputy Director Vernon Walters, who had 
close relations with Hassan, to ensure Hassan’s mandate over Western Sahara by negotiating 
with both Spain and Morocco.159 
 In reference to Morocco’s aspiring Green March, Kissinger met with U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs Alfred Atherton to guarantee Hassan’s annexation of 
Western Sahara. Atherton suggested to Kissinger to 
 Let the marchers go into [Western Sahara] ten kilometers, and let a token number 
 go all the way to Laayoune, and having done this turn around and go back. And to 
 do all they can to see that the UN self-determination procedure comes out in favor 
 of Morocco. This has been carried back to Hassan.160 
 
After Kissinger asked if Hassan was guaranteed the territory, Atherton responded that the 
territory was guaranteed, but only through the UN. Atherton stated that 
 In the way of a promise that it will come out in the end the way he wants, after 
 going through the UN procedure. It isn’t a 100 percent guarantee. But I don’t see 
 that there is any more he can hope for or will have any support from anybody 
 else.161 
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 Although support was adamant from the United States, Spain attempted to prevent the 
situation from escalating. Their attempts to bring the Green March into the UN Security Council 
were ineffective. Although the Security Council passed Resolution 380, which requested 
Morocco to “immediately withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants in 
the march,”162 it was met with the United States changing the resolutions wordage to deplore, 
rather than condemn.163 Further prevention by the United States was also seen in the Security 
Council, blocking any sort of action to be taken in Western Sahara. Former U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations Daniel Moynihan mentioned that 
 The United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this 
 about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly 
 ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I 
 carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.164 
 
 In preparation of a military invasion, the United States provided a show of support for 
Morocco by bringing the Little Rock aircraft carrier and making available twenty F-4 jets from 
the same carrier. The United States also intended to provide Morocco with “twenty-four F-5E 
fighter plans and $36 million worth of armored vehicles”165 It was soon inevitable that the 
United States would be funding a new proxy war to secure Hassan’s sovereignty in the region. 
 After the invasion occurred, Spain wanted to maintain their commitment to transitioning 
administrative power to the Saharawi population. Prince Juan Carlos visited Laayoune after 
Moroccan military forces crossed into Saharawi territory. Carlos, being the interim head of state 
due to a terminally-ill Francisco Franco, voiced Spain’s commitment by showing their support to 
the Saharawi population. Meanwhile, Spain was undergoing an economic crisis, leaving them 
reliant on renewing the United States’ military bases and arms supply. Using this to their 
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advantage, the United States was able to convince Spain to hand over their administering power 
to Morocco and Mauritania. Thus, the Madrid Accords in 1976 were signed, officially ending 
Spanish colonialism and beginning Morocco’s occupation.166 
 
The Carter Administration 
 Throughout the Cold War, the United States supported multiple proxy wars in order to 
prevent communism from spreading to other developing nations. The belief that weak states 
were more prone to be supported by the Soviet Union posed a threat to the United States and its 
hegemonic capabilities. Fear of losing power was so adamant that the United States needed to 
provide pro-Western developing countries with arsenal to prevent communism from spreading 
throughout the rest of the developing world. In the case of Morocco, Hassan’s power was at 
stake with high inflation, an astonishing unemployment and poverty rate, and two coup attempts 
that threatened his throne. For fear of losing a highly pro-Western ally, the United States 
provided numerous amounts of weapons during the Western Saharan war, fluctuating between 
regimes until the ceasefire in 1989. 
 Although the Carter Administration aimed to lessen their military support to developing 
nations, the Moroccan/Western Saharan war halted this aspiration. Since the invasion, military 
aid from the United States increased astronomically from 1974-1978, estimating amounts from 
$4.1 million to $99.8 million.167 Initially, the Carter Administration announced its non-
recognition of Moroccan claims to the territory, referring to the 1960 US Morocco agreement 
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that prohibits the “use of U.S. arms by Morocco outside its internationally recognized 
borders.”168 
 Concerns of the increase of U.S. military aid to the region grew from members of US 
congress as well as academics familiar to the conflict. Thus, a public U.S. Congressional hearing 
took place in 1977, allowing representatives from the U.S. Congress as well as Polisario and 
Moroccan officials to voice their opinions and concerns. One particular statement from 
Representative Charles Diggs stated a glooming observation that “the United States, with its 
close military ties to Morocco, has made [the US], in the eyes of some, guilty by association.”169 
Academics, such as Thomas Frank, Professor of Law at New York University at the time, stated 
that the United States must “encourage efforts to reaffirm the right of self-determination in the 
present session of the United Nations General Assembly.”170 Due to increased concern of US 
artillery being used in the non-recognized territories of Morocco, “President Carter ordered in 
February 1978 a ban on the delivery of ammunition and weapons to Morocco.”171 
 This did not, however, prevent the United States being involved in other ways. Reports of 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters 
state that the two initiated new military connections for Morocco’s war efforts, gaining military 
support from Iran, Jordan, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa.172 According to these reports, 
“Walters received at least $300,000 for his work with Morocco from a company that specializes 
in selling sophisticated military technology to foreign governments.”173 Although these new 
strategies deemed hopeful for Morocco, the struggle continued to maintain a strong offensive 
against the Polisario. According to an article in Newsweek, King Hassan blamed the Carter 
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Administration for lacking an African policy, stating that Morocco “does not ask the United 
States to intervene but to give its military and economic support and provide an active diplomacy 
for its friends working for the interest of the Free World.”174 Morocco was beginning to look 
desperate. 
 Countless lobbying took place between 1977 and 1979 from the King, testing the 
relations between the Carter Administration and the Kingdom of Morocco. Although 
propositions for military support were proposed by the president, Congress continued to vote 
against military aid support. However, in 1978, Morocco hired DGA International, a public 
relations firm, to promote increased military support for its war efforts.175 Lobbying for 
increased military aid could not have come at a better time, considering Polisario forces were 
“winning a string of military victories and the stability of King Hassan’s throne [was] in 
question.”176 Furthermore, in 1979, the United States witnessed the Iranian Revolution and the 
hostage crisis that followed, creating a different outlook on foreign policy altogether. Thus, in 
May 1979, “the State Department approved a proposal from Northrop Communications to 
construct a $200 million electronic detection system to help the Moroccans locate elusive 
Polisario fighters in the desert” as well as direct US counterinsurgency support in the region.177 
 Congress’ disapproval to US sale of arms and its foreign policy transition were neglected. 
Voicing concern over the violation of the 1960 US Arms agreement between Morocco and the 
United States, the sale was argued as a “defense strategy” after Polisario guerilla forces entered 
Moroccan territory.178 The United States sold “the OV-10 armed reconnaissance aircraft” and 
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“AH-1 attack helicopters with anti-tank missiles.”179 The arms sales increased from $86 million 
in 1978 to $133 million in 1979180 President Carter, ignoring Polisario’s attempt to improve its 
diplomatic relations with the United States and steering away from his ambition to be a human 
rights president, had hoped that this arms sale would 
 help [Morocco]’s efforts to defend itself while at the same time nurturing and 
 encouraging a psychological climate in the region conducive to negotiations, 
 efforts to bring both sides to the negotiations table must parallel efforts to 
 strengthen Morocco militarily.181 
 
 Carter’s attempt to bring peace through a military framework provoked Hassan to 
increase his military offensive, causing a serious budget crisis in Morocco’s already trembling 
economy with war costs of over $1.5 million a day.182 The increase in arms sales had not only 
violated an international treaty, but also demonstrated militaristic and economic support to the 
Moroccan Kingdom after publicly announcing their “neutrality” regarding Morocco their 
occupation over Western Sahara. This was a position which Reagan so stubbornly supported 
once he took office. 
 
The Reagan Administration 
 President Reagan’s staunch anti-Soviet agenda became a benefit for Morocco’s war 
efforts in Western Sahara. A week after Reagan took office in 1981, “Reagan approved the 
controversial sale of 108 M-60 battle tanks to Morocco”183 along with “large C-130 aircraft with 
side-looking airborne radar” and “K-130 tanker planes for midair refueling.”184 Although the 
Reagan administration also proclaimed neutrality in the region—neither recognizing the SADR 
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nor Morocco’s annexation—the President of the Saharawi National Council sent a letter to the 
Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee addressing the amount of aggression taking 
place in Western Sahara: 
 The so-called limited support by the administration revealed itself to be a real 
 arsenal of war: tanks, reconnaissance planes and other weapons suitable for the 
 colonial war in the Western Sahara. The U.S. also dispatched new military experts 
 in counterinsurgency operations to bolster the ability of the Moroccan army in the 
 field. There was indeed a tendency for a larger involvement from the U.S. side in 
 a wider conflict. Further support from the U.S. encouraged King Hassan to be 
 more intransigent and comfortable in pursuing his territorial conquest.185 
 
 The United States’ “neutrality” in regards to the conflict is obviously questionable during 
the Reagan administration. Yet, Reagan was adamant on pursuing its militaristic defeat against 
the Soviet Union through its proxy wars. Supporting its allies with increased arms sales and 
military conquests was the United States’ main initiative in a bipolar world. The House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, echoed congressional disapproval of increased 
arms sales to Morocco, stating that military funding for a peaceful settlement will not see any 
success: 
 The qualitative change in military assistance the United States is providing may 
 well have a negative impact on the achievement of a political solution in the 
 Western Sahara. The concrete assistance and symbolic message these kinds of 
 military cooperation send appear counterproductive to the U.S. commitment to a 
 political solution.186 
 
 The logical reasoning stated from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs was 
nevertheless neglected. The construction of the illegal wall ranging from the Mauritanian border 
all the way to proper Morocco was militarily funded by both France and the United States. By 
1982, arms supply nearly doubled since the Carter administration increased its military 
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funding.187 There was no doubt that the United States fully cooperated Morocco’s military 
offense strategy. 
 Considering the amount of arms flowing into Morocco, there was no intention of 
negotiating a peace deal. The peace settlement plan initiated by the Organization of African 
Union (OAU), which attempted bring both parties to the negotiating table, was met with 
Moroccan opposition. In response, the OAU admitted the SADR as its 51st member. In response, 
“the United States circulated a secret document stating that ‘the admission of the SADR to the 
OAU would be a grave mistake’ and urging…African states [to] boycott the summit.”188 
 Considering multiple opportunities to broker a peace deal, the United States continued its 
efforts to prevent any negotiations by escalating military aid. What does the United States gain 
from deterring self-determination and supporting an illegal war and occupation in Western 
Sahara? There are specific reasons behind this ideology. First, Morocco plays an important role 
for U.S. interests in Africa, such as offering Moroccan soldiers to “suppress uprisings against 
pro-U.S. Zairian President Mobutu” in the late 1970s. Furthermore, the United States, by 
avoiding the violation of the Clark Amendment, which prohibits any direct support of Angolan 
opposition troops, used Morocco as a figure for American interests through shipping American 
artillery.189 
 Second, Morocco plays an important role for US diplomatic interests in the Middle East. 
Morocco hosted meetings between Egyptian and Israeli leaders, preparing the framework for the 
Camp David Accords. Considering Morocco is “Israel’s closes contact in the Arab world,” the 
Kingdom was not reluctant when meeting with President Reagan in 1982 to announce their 
willingness to recognize the state of Israel in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian 
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state.”190 Along with US naval bases, joint US/Moroccan military training and allowed CIA 
access for American interests, the United States and Morocco heavily relied on each other for 
their specific interests during the course of the sixteen year war. 
 Between both Reagan and Carter administrations, the United States’ continued support of 
Morocco’s illegal occupation throughout the duration of the war illustrates the importance of 
power politics over international law. There is no doubt that the United States recognizes the 
illegality of the occupation, but as history shows political motives tend to interfere with 
diplomatic integrity. The United States’ undying Moroccan support showed no hesitation 
considering the amount at stake for US interests in both Africa and the Middle East. 
Unfortunately, the peace process between Western Sahara and Morocco shows an even gloomier 
picture from the United States. 
 
The United States and the Stalled Peace Process 
 During the ineffective voting registration process in the 1990s, the United States 
maintained its diplomatic position to support Moroccan occupation. Once again, the Clinton 
administration neither recognized Moroccan annexation nor an independent state. After the 
Security Council allowed the initiation of MINURSO, the voting registration process saw no 
progress to begin a vote. The Clinton administration, although remaining close ties to the 
Kingdom, remained occupied with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as well as Kosovo and 
Yugoslavia. 
 Regardless, it was the United States’ support of the Moroccan Kingdom which more than 
likely influenced the United States’ lack of intervention. Yet, after nearly a decade since the 
creation of MINURSO, the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing before the 
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Subcommittee on Africa to explore its continued funding of the project. Nearly $440 million has 
been spent on this project alone with continued obstacles from Rabat’s faulty voter registration 
claims. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Allen 
Keiswetter, the United States “continue[d] to strongly support the mediation efforts of the United 
Nations undertaken since the late-1980s.”191 However, the congressional hearing showed, once 
again, the disapproval for the United States’ lack of influencing a more efficient peace process. 
 Representative Joseph Pitts from Pennsylvania, in response to Keiswetter’s claim that the 
Polisario continues to hold Moroccan POWs, clearly illustrates the United States’ lack of critical 
thinking due to its close ties to the Kingdom: 
 I visited with about 70 POWs who were Moroccan, some who have been there for 
 20 years, and was told that they were free to return, that they had not received 
 permission to return. Now, maybe that has occurred since then, but I think if we 
 can start exchanging, get the POW’s back, also, identify missing 
 persons…exchange lists, removing land mines, do the humanitarian things, many 
 of these kinds of efforts toward a peaceful settlement would be very helpful.192 
 
Unfortunately, none of these strategies were taken into consideration. 
 During this hearing, James Baker had already been assigned as the UN Special Envoy to 
the conflict in hopes of finally finding a new solution. Considering this new opportunity, Baker 
finally brought both parties to the negotiating table after decades of refusal to sign the Houston 
Accords in 1997. This renewed the voting registration that fell apart three years earlier. 
Considering the referendum was stalled, Baker needed a new strategy to promote a peace deal. 
 Yet, after years of aggression, oppression, economic inflation, and a faulty war that 
nearly cost his throne, King Hassan II died of a heart attack in 1999. This led to his son, 
Mohammed VI, to take his reign. This opportunity had two different outcomes. On the one hand, 
Mohammed VI wanted to portray himself less like his father by having a more liberal approach 
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to his country. By implementing new laws that promote women’s rights and poverty programs, 
Mohammed VI was portrayed as a more lenient and liberal ruler. On the other, being a new King 
meant testing his own strong will and power. Thus, he maintained his father’s mentality on 
proclaiming Western Sahara as Moroccan territory. This deemed as a challenge to his 
sovereignty and to Baker’s peace plan. 
 Once again, the voting registration did not see any progress considering both sides could 
not agree on each other’s numerical voting registers. Both agreed that voters must be ethnic 
Saharawis, but with Polisario’s request for the 1974 census resulting in 70,000 voters were only 
half of Morocco’s registered voters, resulting in faulty voting registration. Baker came with a 
second initiative. 
 This peace plan saw the occupied territories acting as an autonomous state. In other 
words, the occupied territories would act as an autonomous state for five years, and then vote on 
the idea of either assimilation or continued autonomy. Morocco applauded the idea, but Polisario 
was reluctant considering their quest for independence. Therefore, Baker came with the third 
proposition, but including the vote of independence. Polisario, reluctant at first, supported the 
plan after Algerian encouraged the Polisario to accept. 
 Morocco decided to prolong their refusal by as long as they could. Meanwhile, Morocco 
was attempting to gain support from the United States and France to veto any form of resolution 
that would enforce Morocco to go through with the peace plan. During this time, the United 
States has already initiated its War on Terrorism after the tragic September 11, 2001 attacks. By 
2003, it had already begun its militaristic invasion of Iraq, which gained some of its support from 
Morocco. 
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 The United States’ vote became adamant to support Morocco after the May 16, 2003 
bombings in Casablanca took place. After 33 civilians killed, Washington stated that “the close 
U.S.-Morocco relationship, [their] appreciation for Morocco’s steadfast support in the global war 
on terror, and for King Mohammed’s role as a visionary leader in the Arab world” reiterated US 
support for Morocco.193 Thus, the United States prevented James Baker, a close friend to the 
Bush family, to carry out his final attempt to bring peace into the region. 
 
Obama and the Future 
 As history continues to repeat itself, Morocco has consistently appealed to the United 
States’ interests and beliefs. During the Arab Spring of 2011, countries in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Libya saw an increasing amount of nonviolent movements to topple dictators and establish a 
more democratic institution with the US promoting the movements. Morocco, on the other hand, 
used this to their advantage. By drafting a new constitution in July 2011, this tested the popular 
support of the King, which was positive. Considering the large pro-Western ideology seen in 
Morocco, there was not much of a protest to begin with. Seeing this strategy resulted in the 
United States promoting Moroccan efforts further implementing Western ideologies. 
 However, Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed that human rights monitoring must 
be conducted within occupied Western Sahara. This was a different strategy compared to 
previous administrations. Unfortunately, this would have many risks. Considering the amount of 
phosphate production and fisheries off of the coast of the occupied territories, Morocco would 
lose European profits (an illegal act of itself). In response to US’s ambition, Morocco cancelled 
the historic US/Moroccan joint military exercise in protest. Gaining support from France, 
Morocco reiterated the importance of US/Morocco relations. Claiming “unknown” reasons, the 
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United States backed off.194 The UN resolution was passed, allowing MINURSO to be funded 
for an extra year, but did not allow human rights monitoring in the occupied territories. Had the 
Obama Administration carried out this action, it could have led to a new Western Sahara. Once 
again, the United States stays reluctant to expose one of its closest allies. 
 Considering nearly 40 years of consistent support for the Kingdom, the United States’ 
outlook on the conflict will remain the same. Regardless of the illegality that is taking place in 
Western Sahara, the United States will stand alongside one of its closest allies, continuing to 
influence their motives and interests via Morocco. 
 
Saharawi Identity: Women in the Face of Imperialism 
 Understanding the cultural differences between Morocco and Western Sahara is vitally 
important to recognize. Distinguishing between both cultures is a strong argument against 
Morocco’s legal ties to the territory, which can be (and has been) used in a legal framework to 
present evidence of forced assimilation. Between language and living differences, this is the 
stronghold for self-determination in Western Sahara. 
 One very important way of distinguishing between the two cultures is looking at 
differentiation of women in both cultures. Examining the way women have been incorporated 
into Saharawi lifestyle is an important aspect which has been rarely recognized. It is this 
particular strategy which differentiates between the colonizer and the colonized. Therefore, 
within this section, I examine how Saharawi women have been impacted during the occupation 
and how their role in Saharawi self-determination differs from Moroccan culture. 
                                                          
194
 Michelle Nichols. “UN Councils Extends Contentious Western Sahara Peacekeeping Mission.” Reuters. © Thomson Reuters 
 2013. Article published April 25, 2013. Last accessed November 4, 2013. 
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/us-westernsahara-un-idUSBRE93O0Z020130425 
70 
 
 
 
 First, I examine women prior to the Moroccan invasion. This will illustrate how women 
have played important roles during and before Spanish colonialism. Then, I will examine how 
women have been incorporated in the struggle for self-determination via the SADR. The gender 
mainstreaming framework that the SADR and the Polisario use is not simply an image, but it is 
valuably important to their culture and identity as a whole. 
 What I aim to accomplish with this segment is to properly illustrate the ambitions and 
motives behind the Polisario Front as well as the SADR. These accomplishments have 
continuously gone unnoticed by most Western states who continue to support Moroccan 
occupation. Furthermore, it also reveals the illusion which they United States had throughout the 
sixteen year war. I focus on how the SADR is not considered nor an organization found on 
radical values. Instead, it is a state that has more Western principles than its colonizer. 
 
Saharawi Women Prior to Spanish Colonization 
 Through a Western lens, it would be depicted that Saharawi civilization would not 
recognize the rights of women. According to Edward Said’s theory in his book Orientalism, he 
argues that Western images of Arab or Muslim populations illustrate a sense of negativity and 
violence. This image creates a stereotype commonly used behind policies implemented by 
Western states.195 
 It is this particular framework that sparked Spanish colonization in the Western Sahara. 
Prior to the first colonization period, the Saharawi population was “strongly matriarchal.”196 
Within the population, “women were considered, respected, and contributed to society as much 
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as other members did.”197 As mentioned above, the ethnic history of Saharawi people derived 
from two socio-cultural backgrounds. This integration of populations “developed strategies of 
diverse cultural contents which differentiate them from other Muslim women.”198 Women in 
Arab nomad societies (such as Beni Hassan in Western Sahara) were always assigned the roles 
of managing the assets and functions of the tribe. 
 Women’s functionality within Western Sahara had much greater self-autonomy 
compared to other strict Muslim societies: 
 Women could inherit property and could subsist independently of fathers, 
 brothers, and husbands. Women were valued by Saharawi tribes among which 
 monogamy was the rule for their importance in establishing alliances through 
 marriage, within and across tribes. Saharawi women ruled the tent and played a 
 major role in the tribal education of her children. She also wore no face veil and 
 had great personal freedom within the tribal encampment, whose open tents were 
 conducive to easy converse among men and women.199200 
 
 The social structure among Saharawi populations did not devalue women in any shape or 
form. As opposed to a stereotypical Muslim society, women were regarded as very important 
factors for maintaining lifestyle in the Bedouin society. However, the start of Spanish 
colonization in 1884 destroyed the social structure of gender equality so heavily practiced among 
the Saharawi nomadic tribes. Spanish colonization “brought about an enforced process of 
backwardness, disorganization, and misery, stripping Saharawi culture of its egalitarian 
traditions.”201 To prevent a Saharawi uprising, Spanish colonialists suppressed women toward 
“ignorance and illiteracy,” enforcing women to be “useless in society.”202 
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 The Spanish strategy, like most colonialists in the African continent, aimed toward a 
patriarchal society through exploitation. Although colonialist strategies were aimed toward 
dehumanizing women, Saharawi women actively and relentlessly resisted any invasion from 
foreigners. “Saharawi women had provided financial and in-kind support to and directly 
participated in resistance movements against the Spanish during the 1930s, from 1957 to 1958, 
and in the late 1960s.”203 Spanish colonization did not impede the importance of women’s 
involvement in Saharawi culture. Rather, colonization empowered women to fight alongside men 
equally for independence. 
 The strategy of colonization is aimed at exploiting indigenous populations for the benefit 
of the colonizer. Using Lenin’s theoretical framework in his piece Imperialism, it is the objective 
to export capital into “backward societies” aimed at gaining more profit for the colonizer.204 
Spanish colonization in Western Sahara was met with strong opposition and the will to maintain 
Saharawi culture. This sense of nationalist pride led to the creation of the POLISARIO Front, 
which was aimed at fighting Spanish colonizers for Western Saharan independence. As it 
succeeded in defeating the Spanish, it was met with Moroccan forces, adamant on annexing 
Western Sahara. 
 
POLISARIO and Gender Mainstreaming 
 In the wake of Moroccan imperialism, the POLISARIO Front was challenged by a 
military heavily backed by the United States and other Western nations. The POLISARIO faced 
a nation seeking for a “Greater Morocco, a vision of Morocco that also includes the present 
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Kingdom of Morocco, part of Algeria, all of Mauritania, part of Mali, and part of Senegal.”205 
Although this challenge seemed impossible, the POLISARIO still manages to maintain their 
ambition for independence. Intriguingly, the “male founders of the Front…saw equality for 
women as a key strategy.”206 
 The POLISARIO’s ideology “envisaged an egalitarian, communal society, in which 
slavery was abolished and the emancipation of women and their full participation in society has 
an aim.”207 This significant inclusion of gender equality differentiates from most revolutionary 
movements throughout world history. By incorporating the importance of gender equality, the 
POLISARIO Front believed it would be able to fulfill their goals of the revolution, which 
 was to transport the people from the world of oppression, slavery, and 
 colonialism, to the world of light, liberation, and democracy. This  included the 
 objective of eradicating tribalism, not only to unite the population but also…to 
 increase the level of gender equality in light of the effect of its influence in the 
 state-formation of nearby states, especially Morocco and Algeria.208 
 
 The Front was ambitious in incorporating women into the political struggle for Saharawi 
independence. They believed it was an obligation “to guarantee political and social rights to 
women and to open the way to women’s development, to eliminate all cause of social 
degeneration, [and] to adopt a policy of free and obligatory education for all parts of the 
society.”209 Thus, the National Union of Saharawi Women (NUSW) was created to serve such a 
purpose. Its goals were to “contribute to the national consciousness, to assist in the mobilization 
of efforts for independence, to work for the emancipation of women and to liberate the Saharawi 
woman from the results of colonialism.”210 
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 The incorporation of women is aimed to portray an image separate from their Moroccan 
oppressors. This image includes four particular levels that are used in the Front. First, they 
proclaimed that all men and women are equal and have the same rights. Second, the Front 
requested that women fully participate in society and perform many roles and functions. Third, 
the position of women will be irreversible in the future. Finally, women are the signifiers of the 
nation as well as transmitters of the culture.211 
 The POLISARIO aimed to use this strategy of gender equality to “reinforce what it 
means to be Saharawi in the face of Morocco.”212 The social structure established in Western 
Sahara portrays women as the representatives of “democracy, freedom, and equality.”213 These 
images challenge Islamic norms in revolutionary groups in Islamic countries, considering that 
gender equality is “probed into the background…given that gender claims are supposed to be 
contrary to the popular tradition and could even break the unity of the national fight.”214 Through 
gender mainstreaming, “the Saharawi woman has achieved equality [and] social freedom. 
Freedom of Saharawi women lies in its maturity, in the grade of its attachment to national 
identity, to the values of its people.”215 This not only challenges their Moroccan oppressors who 
envision “POLISARIO’s discourse as subjugated and weak,”216 but also challenges Western 
orientalism who continue to view Arab or Muslim movements as fundamentalist ideologies. 
 Although the POLISARIO Front challenges the norms of Islam, they do not ignore their 
Islamic culture. Saharawi people follow a moderate interpretation of Islam, which still makes 
religion a personal issue: 
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 This is a moderate form of Islam, free from any sectarianism or dogmatism. 
 Owing to its tolerance, it encourages solidarity, fosters unity, disdains violence 
 and hatred and combats arbitrariness and oppression. It has been the true unifying 
 agent of the national.217 
 
With this interpretation of Islam considered, it opposed certain aspects of Islamic family law. For 
example, the Front did not recognize polygamy because of the “injustice that would exist 
between the husband and the wives.”218 Furthermore, it highly encouraged unveiling of women, 
considering the “real veil is respect and faith”219 of women in Islam. 
 In summation, the POLISARIO Front believed the key factor for political mobility was 
the incorporation of women’s rights. It is both an important ethnic factor as well as an image that 
will portray their advancement in society. The POLISARIO used three strategies to incorporate 
gender equality within their society: First is their importance of running the Tindouf refugee 
camp based in Algeria; second is their incorporation into the military; third is the importance of 
Saharawi women promoting their independence abroad. 
 
Running the Refugee Camps 
 After fleeing their homes, the POLISARIO Front needed to promote services to help 
improve refugees’ social status. As the majority of POLISARIO Front were men, that left 
women in charge of running the camps. The Front’s ambition for promoting education was 
exercised through the NUSW by establishing “committees on literacy and children’s education, 
health, sanitation, crafts, supplies, and arts.”220 The majority of those running the program, in 
some cases dominantly, are women: 
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 Through the NUSW, women during conflict and after 1991 planned and 
 organized the functioning of all sectors in the camps: they were in charge of 
 different working committees established in each neighborhood, such as 
 education and training, health, food distribution, and justice and social issues.221 
 
 The structure of the NUSW focused around the local, regional, and national level by 
working in areas of “occupied territories and emigration, information and culture, political and 
professional training, and foreign affairs.”222 Furthermore, women took on larger roles to 
maintain regularity in the camps. Most were in charge of managing the resources given from 
outside donors such as water, food, sanitation, and health supplies. In addition, this included 
establishing the Women’s Cooperatives Program: 
 The will to strengthen local economic and productive structures, in particular by 
 the promotion of small initiatives of productive cooperatives among 
 women…Women aim not only at obtaining economic benefits for them and their 
 families, but also to increase the level of empowerment needed to improve their 
 status within family and community relations.223 
 
 The most empowering tool for women in the camps was the Front’s ambition to send 
women to further their education. The Front strongly believed that women faced the issues of 
colonialism just as equally to men and therefore “should receive a cultural and political 
education in order to help her carry out her decisive role in the revolution.”224 Their forefront to 
revolution relied on the education of everyone, particularly women. In doing so, they took strong 
initiatives to guarantee their education: 
 In the refugee camps, [the only] six women who had attended high school  were 
 sent for further education abroad, and the several dozen women who had attended 
 elementary school were sent to high school. By 1982 those  few women students 
 who had been sent to Algeria, England, Panama, Spain, and various Latin 
 American countries for extended schooling had returned. In 1988, over 64 percent 
 of teaching staff in the camps were women and they continue to grow.225 
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 The ambition for the POLISARIO Front to send women to higher education became a 
forefront for the camps, especially in regards to lacking public health and hygiene: 
 A small number of women were sent to Cuba, Nicaragua, Algeria, and Spain for 
 training in health professions. By 1987 there was a Saharawi woman gynecologist 
 and a woman dentist. By 1989 Saharawi women served as nurses, doctors, 
 practical nurses, technicians, cooks, and cleaning personnel in the health 
 structures within the camps. They attended health care workshops in the camps 
 led by Saharawi doctors as part of an ongoing staff development program, and 
 began to teach nutrition and hygiene to women through the health committees.226 
 
 Women were given an education through the POLISARIO Front. This was a revolution 
fought with not just a militia, but through the education of people altogether. “Schooling for 
women has continued to be a priority over the years”227 because education was a forefront to 
change and hope for the population. Being heavily supported by the Front’s initiative, the 
importance of women’s involvement through continued education is obvious to be the forefront 
of the revolutionary struggle. 
 
Women in Arms 
 In the face of imperialism, the Front needed enough will power from both men and 
women to join the force against colonialism. Rather than neglecting women in joining arms, the 
camps “established a women’s boarding school”228 and encouraged women to undergo military 
training. Their military training and involvement included “radio operators, drivers, medics, and 
light arms.”229 This was to further the Front’s initiative on promoting women’s involvement to 
be more visible. 
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 Most importantly, women’s involvement in the military included helping people flee 
cities and towns within occupied territories under heavy attack: 
 Saharawi combatants and NUSW militants took charge of people fleeing the 
 major towns of the Western Sahara for refuge in the desert. They organized 
 shelter, supplies, and protection for the refugees, who primarily were women and 
 children. Surviving the attacks on these desert refugees, the women leaders helped 
 the refugees relocate to the safety of camps in Algeria.230 
 
 Women’s involvement in the military joined “against the wishes of their male relatives, 
who, remembering the failure of earlier resistance efforts, feared violent reprisals.”231 These 
wishes and fears did not hold back women’s involvement in military forces. This option of 
empowerment toward Saharawi women continues to differentiate between guerilla movements 
throughout the lower developing nations. 
 
Saharawi Women Abroad 
 Promoting Saharawi self-determination abroad has seen difficulties. Considering only a 
handful of states recognize the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Saharawi 
representation is hardly recognized in key important states. Saharawi women facing international 
representation face the “stereotypes of being a Muslim fragile state.”232 However, the Saharawi 
empowerment seen in women in the camps is also present when representing Saharawi self-
determination abroad: 
 Delegations of women have attended numerous international for a such as  the 
 European Conference of Coordination and Support to the Saharawi People 
 (EUCOCO), the EU in 2008, and at the Ninth Congress of the PAN African 
 Women’s Organization, the NUSW was elected as their UN’s representatives.233 
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 International recognition of the POLISARIO Front’s and NUSW’s has not gone 
unnoticed. Australian delegates and scholars who visited the region noticed the importance of 
women’s integration in the movement of self-determination as a stronghold. They believed that 
even women in their own country do not take such a prominent role in government action. With 
this recognition, Australia is one of few Western states that has recognized the SADR and 
continues to boycott Moroccan companies and officials. 
 The POLISARIO became critical of anyone who attempted to block women from 
participation. The NUSW argued that “women had a duty to work in order to honor the 
slogan…there is no room for lazy people amongst the Saharawis.”234 This encouragement for 
women’s participation “is a clear manifestation that women are not just victims of conflict, but 
above all active agents who develop a great number of strategies to resist and minimize its 
negative impacts.”235 Rowlands states that empowerment is not solely based on the access of 
decision making, but “also about the processes that lead people to perceive themselves as 
capacitated and legitimated to occupy those decision-making spaces.”236 
 From June 17-19, 1991, the SADR established a new constitution for independence, 
developed by the Eighth National Popular Congress. The new constitution promotes civil and 
human rights to all Saharawis. However, it set aside a section specifically for women’s rights, 
continuing to promote the importance of traditional culture amongst Saharawi women: 
 The state will aim to defend the political, economic, and social rights of Saharawi 
 women and will guarantee their participation in the improvement of society and 
 the development of the country.237 
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 The POLISARIO Front’s initiative of gender mainstreaming illustrates how Saharawi 
women “enjoy great autonomy in comparison to Western women.”238 Opposing the effects of 
patriarchal colonization empowers Saharawi women to carry on promoting their own identity. 
The conflict transformed Saharawi women. Within a harsh environment and very few resources, 
challenges were given to women to maintain their living standards. “Saharawi women faced the 
task of restructuring family and social life in the camps.”239  In a movement that promotes gender 
equality as a forefront to their mission, the accomplishments within women in the camps and in 
occupied territories are important to recognize. 
 
A Moroccan Assessment 
 Throughout this research I have examined the history behind Morocco’s ambition to 
annex Western Sahara along with the help from the United States. Examining the long lasting 
quest for Western Saharan self-determination has led to the belief that powerful nations—with 
help from other powerful nations—and their quests for political or economic interests are the 
only deterrent from implementing the universal practice of human rights and international law. It 
is this methodology that prevents weaker states from fully developing in an already competitive 
global market, increasing the gap between rich and poor nations. Morocco’s nationalist 
expansion into Western Sahara may have benefited the Moroccan economy, but not its 
diplomatic image. Furthermore, this adds another conflict to which the United States has been a 
part of and refuses to recognize the wrongdoings by the Moroccan government. 
 Yet, this diplomatic image seems nonexistent to Moroccan citizens and certain key US 
policymakers. The Moroccan diaspora refuses to recognize Western Sahara as a separate entity 
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due to increased nationalist propaganda within the country. Experiencing this propaganda 
firsthand illustrates how authoritarian leaders are able to manipulate their citizens in the new 
post-modern world. This capability enables leaders to seek their interests with the support of its 
own citizens as well as their powerful allies. 
 In this section I will analyze the Moroccan diaspora and their perceptions of the Western 
Sahara. It is vitally important to note that this topic is considered a taboo in Morocco as any 
critique to the Moroccan regime in Western Sahara can lead to false imprisonment, torture, 
disappearance and/or even death. Furthermore, I illustrate the perceptions of US policymakers 
and their ambition, or lack thereof, to implement changing their foreign policy agenda in 
Western Sahara. Finally, I give suggestions for all parties for future peace processes. 
 
Moroccan Citizens 
 In late November of 2011, I visited a public university in Fes. During this time, 
demonstrations were being held during the voting period of a new parliament. Around the busy 
morning period, when classes are starting and students are slowly making their way to the lecture 
halls, I notice about 100-150 students walking around and exploring the display of posters and 
pictures that various student organizations have put together. Curious to discover more about 
how students in Morocco express their opinions, I decided to explore the expressions made by 
these student organizations. 
 I was incredibly taken back by the amount of freedom of expression there was in this 
courtyard as well as the diverse setting. Groups such as women’s rights, student’s rights, and 
even students protesting the new parliament elections were filling the square with their slogans 
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and artwork. However, one particular group that I saw was a student organization based on 
freeing the occupied territories of Palestine.  
 Prior to my visit in Morocco, I had some general knowledge of what was taking place in 
Western Sahara. Curious, I wanted to ask one of the students behind the Free Palestine student 
organization table what they thought of self-determination and occupation. I asked one of the 
students, with my very poor Arabic and my cousin as a translator, what he thinks self-
determination means. His answer, not very far from a textbook answer, stated that it gives the 
people the right to decide for themselves. When I asked my cousin to translate whether or not he 
believes Western Sahara should have this right, my cousin immediately turned to me, with a 
confused look on his face, responding that “Western Sahara is Morocco. They are two different 
scenarios and you can’t compare the two.” As the student behind the table overheard our 
conversation in English, he responded in broken English the same response as my cousin: 
“Western Sahara is Morocco.” After continuously trying to get a better answer, my cousin 
eventually had to tell me to stop talking about Western Sahara, as it could lead us into trouble. 
 That day, when my cousin and I were picked up by my uncle, a prominent lawyer in Fes, 
he asked me what I knew about Western Sahara. Without trying to be offensive, I responded by 
saying that I believe people should have the right to determine their own destiny and future and 
not by governments and military. His response confirmed mine, but he wanted to reassure me 
that Western Sahara was and always will be a part of Morocco and should not be questioned. 
Furthermore, he reassured me that research conducted from outside Morocco is considered faulty 
journalism and biased as it does not consider theorists and intellectuals on the Moroccan side. As 
I was left with no response that would not risk my family’s respect, I decided to drop my 
questions and move on. 
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 Researching this topic has always put me in a very sensitive area. Although I understand 
the importance of nationalism, I do not recognize asking questions as being unpatriotic. Rather I 
consider this as a duty for any human being who believes that something is wrong and must be 
changed. Some of my relatives in Morocco have recognized this “American” side of me as a 
precaution when I am visiting Morocco. It is important to recognize that citizens of any state 
would question their government’s motives or actions and it is not simply an “American” 
characteristic. As a very proud Moroccan who believes that his country is able to advance 
globally, I do not recognize the occupation of Western Sahara as justified and relate it to other 
occupied territories throughout the world. 
 The following question continues to ring in my head: If Moroccan citizens continue to 
support the Palestinian movement against Israeli occupation, then why do Moroccans believe 
that Western Saharan occupation is justified? How do to the two scenarios differentiate when the 
circumstances and the characteristics are the same? The main answer to both of the questions is 
that nationalism portrayed through massive propaganda manipulates its citizens to follow a 
state’s or authoritarian’s national interest. 
 During the 1970s, as mentioned earlier, King Hassan II was under scrutiny for fear of 
losing his throne. Two failed coup attempts proved this theory to be correct along with the 
disappearance of political innovators wanting change in the regime. In order to gain the public’s 
support, the King used Western Sahara as an illustration of power. Using the Istiqlal mentality 
that brought Morocco independence from the French in 1956, the Moroccan people stood behind 
their admirably strong King to take what was “rightfully theirs.” Disregarding international law 
and historical evidence to support that Western Sahara did not in fact belong to Morocco, the 
King had a throne to protect and gained nationalist support “for the good of the nation.” 
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 Thirty-eight years later, this Istiqlal mentality for a “Greater Morocco” maintains its 
importance to the citizens of Morocco. Regardless if the Istiqlal party resigned their seats from 
parliament, the citizens believe that Western Sahara has and always will be part of Morocco. On 
the day my family discovered that I was conducting research on Morocco’s illegal occupation of 
Western Sahara, I received calls as to why it had to be labeled “illegal.” They continued to 
“remind” me that Western Sahara was not illegally obtained by Moroccan forces and that it was 
and always will be part of Morocco. Instead of dropping the subject and accepting its fate, I 
acknowledged their opinions and reminded myself that this is no different from my hometown in 
Redding, CA, on the days of wearing an anti-Bush t-shirt and being told to take it off, as it was 
too “unpatriotic.” 
 
The Moroccan Diaspora 
 Moroccans have a strong sense of nationalism that it is instilled in them since childhood. 
It is this mentality that does not tend to fade regardless if they live inside or outside Morocco. 
However, Moroccans who have emigrated tend to freely express their concerns over issues that 
normally are considered taboo. Depending on the age and educational level, Moroccan emigrants 
tend to question the status of Western Sahara as they freely question the King’s motives. 
 This is not to suggest that the King of Morocco is not normally questioned. Freedom of 
expression is not solely discouraged as protests against certain policies have been addressed. For 
instance, women’s rights protests have been observed after a sixteen year-old girl committed 
suicide when she was forced to marry the man who raped her in accordance to Moroccan family 
law. Furthermore, there were minor protests during February and March of 2011 in Marrakesh 
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and Casablanca, correlating to the rest of the Arab Spring of that same year. Freedom of 
expression is in fact encouraged in Morocco, but not in regards to Western Sahara. 
 Although I do not use human subjects for this research, I have been approached by 
relatives and friends from Morocco living in the United States about my studies. With no 
surprise, I have discovered that Moroccans living outside of Morocco tend to be more accepting 
of self-determination in Western Sahara as opposed to those still living in Morocco. When being 
exposed to new ideas, one becomes more open minded about issues from their own home. With 
not having to feel obliged to accept the fate of Western Sahara, it is easier to recognize the 
atrocities that are taking place. The ability to explore different research and ideas outside of their 
comfort level is a step toward open mindedness, resulting to viewing former ideas in a different 
lens. 
 
US Policymakers 
 For nearly 40 years, the United States has maintained its “neutral” position in accordance 
to the Western Sahara, whereas their foreign policy decisions have noted otherwise. For this 
research, I attempted to gain contact with congressional and senate members to gain a better 
understanding in Washington. Unfortunately, it was met with no response. 
 Throughout my research on this subject, I discovered that an interview with Senator 
Dianne Feinstein would be incredibly appropriate. Senator Feinstein is the chair of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and has requested former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to pay close 
attention to the serious risks in Western Sahara as they cited “growing instability and worrisome 
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trends that could breed terrorism.”240 This led to the United States siding with Morocco for the 
Western Saharan autonomy plan. Unfortunately, Senator Feinstein has not responded to any of 
my inquiries, making it difficult to understand how policymakers feel about the issue. 
 Nevertheless, I attempted to ask members of congress for their opinions on the matter. 
Congresswoman Jackie Speier, a very vocal and prominent member of congress, was contacted 
about the same issue. However, I have been led to the same results with no answers about the 
issue. Furthermore, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has continued leading me with no 
results and no answers on this highly important issue. 
 There can be various reasons behind neglecting my responses. First can be the amount of 
issues that are backing up the aforementioned congressional members and senators. Second, the 
issue is not of high importance to them. There are various foreign policy issues that may be 
considered a higher priority than the United States being involved in violating international 
law—not that surprising. Third, and maybe most likely, members of congress are unaware of the 
issue at hand, making it difficult for them to respond. 
 
Suggestions for the Future 
 As I have examined the aforementioned study, the occupation of Western Sahara has 
violated multiple counts of international law and human rights law. Furthermore, countries who 
encourage other nations to abide by international law, particularly the United States, continue 
neglect that their “neutrality” has caused more harm than done. It is obvious that the SADR 
portrays a more Western ideological framework compared to their occupier. Most importantly, it 
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is crucial for other Moroccans to recognize this phenomenon as the conflict is portrayed as rebel 
groups leading to potential terrorist attacks. 
 Those even in legal backgrounds in Morocco still have the belief that Western Sahara 
was once and is still part of Morocco, disregarding the illegal strategies behind its occupation. It 
is important to recognize when one’s own nation is breaking the law so that the citizens can 
voice their concerns about the country they love and respect. It is in a citizen’s duty to question 
the wrongdoing of their own nation. If questioning said beliefs leads to serious risks upon 
themselves and others, then the nation must reevaluate its own principles. Expelling citizens for 
voicing their concern is a tool for oppression. This must be met by the masses voicing their 
concerns without causing harm to others. Nations are more prone to change if violence is 
excluded from challenging a government’s decision. Violent actions from the government to its 
citizens illustrate the problems of an oppressing regime, an embarrassment no regime wants to be 
made public. 
 Nations must also recognize the importance of abiding their allies. The United States 
continues to do this with not only Morocco, but within the state of Israel and their occupation in 
Palestine. Powerful nations militarily supporting oppressive regimes is not a logical framework 
for establishing peace. It is sophomoric to even consider that peace can come out of violence. 
The only solution coming out of violence is more violence. It is time that the United States 
begins to reconsider its diplomatic positions in areas where occupation flourishes. People are 
killed because they identify with a different nationality than their oppressor. That is not a 
principle which the United States was founded on. The United States must finally take these 
issues seriously. Occupation is a violation of international law and those responsible can be put 
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to trial. By allowing these actions to take place, we then see serious setbacks in our global 
society. 
 If these actions are not taken, then the occupied citizens will take revolt. The “Spring” is 
blooming late in Western Sahara, but these activists are not terrorists. They are continued 
promoters of nonviolence in an occupied world. They do not wish to overthrow Moroccan 
sovereignty, but instead to see their own nation flourish, an aspiration held for over 100 years. 
It’s time the United States examines this issue diplomatically rather than militaristically. 
 
Conclusion 
 As I have shown in the research, Morocco’s occupation over Western Sahara continues to 
violate international law, including international humanitarian law. The international community 
has made little progress in pressing for a peace settlement due to narrowly-conceived political 
and economic interests that block progress from being made. I have also demonstrated how the 
United States has played a particularly important role in Morocco’s occupation by turning a blind 
eye to their geostrategic ally’s illegal actions within the territory. If countries and international 
organizations claim to be committed to upholding international law and defending human rights, 
then they must do so by taking the occupied Western Sahara more seriously. 
 Referring to the research above, Morocco’s initiative to occupy Western Sahara arose out 
of concerns over threats to King Hassan II’s throne. Using nationalism as a tool for rallying 
support for the monarchy, Hassan II’s illegal invasion was portrayed as a part of an anti-colonial 
struggle, passing the idea to generations that Western Sahara belongs to Morocco regardless if 
historical evidence states otherwise. Although this strategy is not uncommon throughout history, 
it has and continues to cost thousands of lives for the sake of nationalist expansionism. The same 
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nationalist propaganda that is blinding the Moroccan government and costing many lives is 
preventing to establish a potential and important trading partner that can possibly lead to a 
greater Maghreb union, stimulating economic growth and stability in the region. 
 I show in the research that Morocco’s occupation over Western Sahara violates 
international and human rights standards on multiple levels. As a state that incorporates human 
rights in its constitution and is also a newly admitted member to the UN Human Rights Council, 
Morocco does not utilize these principles into practice. The research above shows that Moroccan 
forces resort to torture and unfair trials toward Saharawis and Moroccan opponents of the 
occupation. Moroccan forces claim that these perpetrators are violating Moroccan law by 
questioning the King’s throne and are deemed as a threat to Moroccan sovereignty. For the 
duration of the occupation, Morocco has used these tactics in order to maintain its position in 
Western Sahara. Newly admitted to the UNHRC, this will give a chance for the international 
community and various other international organizations to expose Morocco’s continued 
violations of human rights and international law. Allowing this chance for exposure can lead to a 
new Western Sahara and promote the importance of international law and human rights. 
 As I have examined above, the United States’ aiding and abetting Morocco’s illegal 
occupation in Western Sahara adds to the list of dubious US foreign policy initiatives in Africa. 
The United States continues to claim neutrality publicly, but their support to the Kingdom 
throughout the conflict says otherwise. As the United States continues to back Morocco’s 
annexation through selling weapons, military training, economic support, and diplomatic 
acceptance of Morocco’s autonomy plan, then the international community may soon forget the 
long lost struggle and accept Morocco’s illegal nationalist movement. As long as the United 
States considers Morocco as its strong geostrategic ally, it will never truly exercise neutrality. 
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Once the United States officially recognizes that one of their closest African allies is committing 
serious war crimes and violating international law, they will no longer play the aiding and 
abetting role. This strategy will allow the United States to finally put international law ahead of 
its narrowly-perceived national interests, creating a gateway to a new foreign policy agenda. 
 Finally, this research illustrates the functionality of the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic with the importance of incorporating women into the state. Part of the United States’ 
foreign policy objective is to discourage Islamist extremism. By doing so, the United States aims 
to cooperate with countries that incorporate democratic institutions and traditions such as 
advancing the rights of women, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. The status of 
the SADR does not fit the Western stereotypes of an Islamic state as they have incorporated 
democracy, international law, and basic human rights principles into their practice, making the 
SADR an ideal candidate to be an important and geostrategic US ally. Unfortunately, this 
hypothetical alliance will never occur due to the US holding a long lasting alliance with 
Morocco. As the research shows, the SADR is committed to upholding universal human rights as 
well as ideologies that mirror the same principles as the United States. Recognizing these 
characteristics can build a better relationship between the SADR and the US, enabling the 
finding of a middle ground for the long dispute conflict. 
 The importance of this research is to demonstrate the need for nations and organizations 
to utilize human rights and international law into practice. This can be used as a new pathway for 
states to function in regards to foreign policy and to prevent furthering conflict in regions of 
occupation. Western Sahara is subjected to these violations, which can be stopped with ease by 
finally focusing on the lives it costs. Supporting international law and human rights in principle 
may portray a nation in a positive lens, but it is more important that they are carried out in 
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practice. Otherwise, innocent people will be affected by the tools of powerful nations for the 
sake of narrowly defined national interests and political gain, which is something that we cannot 
afford much longer. 
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